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REGULATORY TEXTUALISM
JENNIFER NOU†
ABSTRACT
This Article proposes a textualist approach to regulatory
interpretation. Regulatory textualism, however, should be distinct
from statutory textualism. Judges should interpret regulations armed
not with dictionaries or other general linguistic aids, but rather with a
hierarchy of sources that sheds light on the text’s public meaning.
Methodologically, this approach tailors positive political theory
insights to the rulemaking process. That process features a number of
pivotal actors, or veto-gates, who must sign off on a regulation before
it can proceed. The court’s interpretive task is to privilege those
statements that are more likely to be credible—sincere, not strategic—
reflections of the text’s public meaning.
Specifically, the judge should first consider the preamble’s
provision-by-provision explanations, which frequently respond to
public comments raising potential ambiguities. If ambiguity persists,
the judge should then consult the regulatory analyses, which predict
the rule’s consequences under specific factual scenarios. Both
congressional and presidential veto-gates, as well as the public more
generally, rely on these analyses when engaging with the regulatory
process. Finally, if these materials conflict, the court should then defer
to the agency’s interpretation—provided that the agency provides a
reasoned explanation. In this manner, regulatory textualism asks how
the reasonable reader of a rule would have understood its meaning as
negotiated by the President, Congress, and other politically legitimate
actors.
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INTRODUCTION
Regulatory texts often result from fierce negotiations during the
rulemaking process. These fights can be just as heated as those that
occur over statutes. Indeed, when Congress delegates rulemaking
authority to an agency, it empowers administrators to engage in
1
binding lawmaking. Consider, for example, recent battles over
whether the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) should
2
regulate Internet providers as a public utility or whether the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) should curb carbon
3
emissions from existing power plants. Each of these debates featured
1. See, e.g., Ariz. Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 370, 386
(1932) (characterizing a rulemaking agency as a body that “speaks as the legislature” with
“pronouncement[s that have] the force of a statute”); Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski,
Administrative Change, 59 UCLA L. REV. 112, 116 (2011) (“An agency with authority to issue
these regulations acts as a delegate of Congress, and a lawfully enacted legislative rule binds the
public, the courts, and the agency itself with the force of a statute.”).
2. See Jonathan Weisman, F.C.C. Net Neutrality Rules Clear Hurdle as Republicans
Concede to Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2015, at A1.
3. See Suzanne Goldenberg, Obama Defends New Carbon Emission Rules in Face of
Mounting Backlash, THE GUARDIAN (June 2, 2014, 6:43 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/
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presidential pronouncements and legislative threats, alongside
heated discussions within and with agencies—involving the President,
Congress, interest groups, and the courts. Lower-profile legislative
rules garner less attention, to be sure, but emerge in the shadow of
these political debates.
Contrary to the conventional view of rulemaking as a coherent
and rationalized process of reason-giving, regulatory drafting is often
an exercise in political compromise. Given the stakes involved,
interested parties have thus become increasingly savvy about the
6
many levers available to influence the process. These avenues could
include informal meetings with agency staff, phone calls with White
House officials, participation in congressional oversight hearings, and
7
aggressive litigation threats. Each of these junctures presents
renewed opportunities to lobby drafters for changes to the final
regulatory text and accompanying materials. Indeed, the modern
rulemaking process departs in many ways from the idealized version
often presented in administrative-law casebooks and centered on the
8
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

environment/2014/jun/02/obama-defends-epa-coal-climate-change-rules-backlash [http://perma.
cc/UZ6G-35NG].
4. See, e.g., Ezra Mechaber, President Obama Urges FCC to Implement Stronger Net
Neutrality Rules, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Nov. 10, 2014, 9:15 AM), https://www.whitehouse.
gov/blog/2014/11/10/president-obama-urges-fcc-implement-stronger-net-neutrality-rules [http://
perma.cc/5HTY-TXLE]; Press Release, The White House, Statement by the President on the
Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards (Sept. 2, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2011/09/02/statement-president-ozone-national-ambient-air-quality-standards
[http://perma.cc/CKQ2-VNFR].
5. See, e.g., Tom Risen, Lawmakers Grill FCC Chair on Internet Regulation, U.S. NEWS
(Sept. 17, 2014, 6:18 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/09/17/congress-challengesfcc-chairman-on-net-neutrality [http://perma.cc/2LLG-RVHE]; Cat Zakrzewski, Republicans
Continue Fight Against Net Neutrality with Three New Proposals, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 22,
2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/04/21/republicans-continue-fight-against-net-neutrality-withthree-new-proposals/#.zyuvhz:k8dV [http://perma.cc/LF25-FGCJ].
6. See Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law as Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in a
Highly Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671, 1679 (2011) (“The roster of [regulatory] players has
expanded beyond agency and OIRA staffs, advocates for the regulated industry and beneficiary
groups, and congressional aides to include individuals and organizations with broad policy
agendas, such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, think tanks, grassroots organizations, media
pundits, and Internet bloggers.”).
7. See id. at 1703–19 (surveying various tactics of “blood sport” regulatory policy making).
8. See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative
Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1140 (2014) (“[T]he actual workings of the administrative state have
increasingly diverged from the assumptions animating the APA and classic judicial decisions
that followed.”).
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The interpretation of regulations, in turn, requires attention to
9
these rulemaking realities. Regulations are bargains struck at pivotal
points in the rule-drafting process. These negotiations occur between
interested parties and politically accountable actors such as the
10
agency head, the President, and Congress. What legitimates this
dynamic is not the ensuing private agreements, but rather the
collective rationales that accompany the resulting texts. Since these
rationales inform how the public understands the final regulation,
judges should look to these materials as valid sources of
interpretation.
Accordingly, this Article develops an approach—what it calls
regulatory textualism—that focuses on the public meaning of the
rule’s legally binding text. In doing so, it offers a distinctly textualist
approach for the still-nascent literature on regulatory interpretation,
11
which has been recently reinvigorated by Professor Kevin Stack.
Regulatory textualism, however, is distinct from statutory textualism:
the judge should interpret the codified text armed not with
dictionaries or other general linguistic aids, but rather by structured
reference to select materials generated by the regulatory drafting
process. This approach views rulemaking as the product of
procedures imposed by the President, Congress, and the courts to
imbue the rulemaking with legitimacy. The method thus draws upon
these review processes to generate a hierarchy of sources based on
their public accessibility, reliability, and relevance to the interpretive
question. Different forms of regulatory history can be ranked
9. See Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent: The Place for a “Legislative History” of
Agency Rules, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 255, 281 (2000) (observing that “it is far easier to ascribe an
intent to an agency when it issues a rule than to a legislature when it enacts a statute, both
because of differences in their decisionmaking routines and because of the greater reliability of
the materials that document the bases for their decisions”); Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting
Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 380 (2012) (noting that distinctive features of the regulatory
process such as “the APA’s procedural requirement that the agency issue a statement of basis
and purpose, the arbitrary and capricious review’s standard of rationality, and Chenery’s timing
rule” justify regulatory purposivism); id. at 392–94 (noting that “the critical difference between
regulations and statutes is how the court discerns purposes”); Russell L. Weaver, Judicial
Interpretation of Administrative Regulations: An Overview, 53 U. CINN. L. REV. 681, 711 (1984)
(“Courts must treat regulations differently than statutes because agencies generate different
types of interpretive materials than do legislatures. Instead of committee reports, explanations
of committee chairmen, records of debate and the other materials that legislatures typically
create, agencies prepare notices of proposed rulemakings, draft rules, regulatory analyses and
other documents.”).
10. Such bargains, of course, are not to be confused with the wholly distinct procedure of
negotiated rulemaking, which raises a different set of issues not addressed here.
11. See generally Stack, supra note 9.
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according to the source’s likelihood to shed credible light on the
public meaning of a text with the appropriate level of generality.
Specifically, judges should first consider the preamble’s detailed
provision-by-provision analysis of the regulation, which frequently
responds to public comments raising potential ambiguities in the
12
proposed regulation. This source is the best evidence of the
regulatory text’s public meaning because it results from the agency’s
back-and-forth with external commenters and political monitors. If
ambiguity persists, the judge should then consult the regulatory
analyses, which apply the regulation to specific factual scenarios to
predict the rule’s consequences. Congressional and presidential
reviewers, as well as the public more generally, rely on these analyses
when engaging in the regulatory process. This hierarchy of
interpretive sources tracks the most reliable and accessible materials
likely to reflect, in varying degrees, how a reasonable reader of the
regulation would have understood the meaning of the regulation as
negotiated by the President, Congress, and other authoritative
13
regulatory actors. If these materials conflict with each other or
12. To maintain consistency with other scholars’ terminology, this Article will also define
“preamble” as the agency’s statement of basis and purpose. See, e.g., Stack, supra note 9, at 360–
61 & n.22 (equating “preamble” with the “statement[s] of basis and purpose” required by the
APA) (alteration in original). Note, however, that the term is sometimes used differently by
other scholars to include other materials that agencies publish in the Federal Register alongside
the text and statement of basis and purpose, such as the regulatory analyses required by various
executive orders and statutes. See, e.g., CORNELIUS M. KERWIN & SCOTT R. FURLONG,
RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 75–86 (4th ed.
2011) (observing that agencies “report in preambles the results of the reviews they are required
to conduct under a variety of statutes and executive orders”); id. at 63 (“[A]gencies report in
preambles the results of the reviews they are required to conduct under the Paperwork
Reduction Act, the Regulatory Flexibility Act, and Executive Order 12,866.”); see also KEVIN
M. STACK, GUIDANCE IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS: EVALUATING PREAMBLES,
REGULATORY TEXT, AND FREESTANDING DOCUMENTS AS VEHICLES FOR REGULATORY
GUIDANCE 11, http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Guidance%20in%20the%20
Rulemaking%20Process%20Revised%20Draft%20Report%205_16_14%20ks%20final.pdf
[http://perma.cc/7L57-WGBQ] (noting that preambles include “engagement with
commentators”); Noah, supra note 9, at 311 (observing that “a preamble may have included
reassurances in response to comments that expressed concerns about particular applications of a
proposed rule”).
13. For a sample of the statutory-interpretation literature drawing on positive political
theory, see, for example, Cheryl Boudreau, Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B.
Rodriguez, What Statutes Mean: Interpretive Lessons from Positive Theories of Communication
and Legislation, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 957, 958 (2007); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John
Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523, 523–24 (1992); McNollgast,
Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 5–6 (1994) [hereinafter McNollgast, Legislative Intent] (describing how
positive political theory approaches “overlap[] the legal scholarship that instructs the court to
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otherwise cannot resolve the ambiguity, however, the court should
then defer to the agency’s interpretation—provided that the agency
offers a reasoned explanation.
Methodologically, this approach attempts to tailor positive
political theory insights to help identify the regulatory text’s public
meaning. Indeed, the rulemaking process features a number of
pivotal actors, or veto-gates, who must sign off on a regulation before
14
it can proceed further. Once these pivotal actors have been
identified, the court’s task is to privilege those statements in the
rulemaking record that are most likely to be credible reflections of
15
the public meaning to which regulatory actors agreed. Put
differently, judges should rely on materials that are likely to be
sincere, as opposed to strategic attempts to misstate the terms of the
16
agreement. Statements are sincere when they would incur some cost
17
if the speaker misrepresented the bargain.
This approach balances a number of institutional considerations
18
for selecting among alternative interpretive methods. By restricting
the degrees of freedom to choose sources, it attempts to reduce
judicial decision costs. In contrast to an approach that would consult
only linguistic aids, however, regulatory textualism also seeks to
minimize judicial discretion by identifying narrow contexts in which

ascertain as accurately as possible the ‘original intent’ of legislation”); McNollgast, Positive
Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 707 n.5
(1992) [hereinafter McNollgast, Positive Canons]; Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast,
The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights
Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1418–21 (2003).
14. The term “veto-gate” seems to have first appeared in the legal literature in McNollgast,
Positive Canons, supra note 13, at 707 & n.5. Variations of the core idea are also sometimes
referred to as “pivot points,” “veto players,” or the politics of “negative power”—terms which
this Article will use interchangeably. See, e.g., CHARLES CAMERON, VETO BARGAINING 3
(2000) (defining the politics of “negative power” as the “consequences of an institutionalized
ability to say no”); KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS 23–24 (1998) (drawing on dictionary
definition to specify a “pivot” as “a person or thing on or around which something turns or
depends”).
15. See KREHBIEL, supra note 14, at 23–24 (defining actors that serve as “pivot[s]”).
16. See McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra note 13, at 707 (“A positive political theory
approach also offers guidance in sorting out meaningful or sincere evaluations of legislative
language from strategic or opportunistic posturing by legislators or the President.”).
17. McNollgast, Legislative Intent, supra note 13, at 26 (“Observing costly actions can help
judges exclude some alternative interpretations.”).
18. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 111 (2006); Cass R.
Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretations and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 886 (2003)
(arguing that “debates over legal interpretation cannot be sensibly resolved without attention to
[institutional] capacities”).
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potentially specialized terms should be understood. Moreover, unlike
intentionalist and purposivist approaches that encourage judges to
further what they perceive to be the relevant policy goals, regulatory
textualism instead calls for judges to defer to agencies that are better
suited to the task. In doing so, it allows flexibility for the current
agency’s well-reasoned interpretation when the regulatory text is
otherwise ambiguous.
Part I discusses how various scholars thus far have proposed
interpreting regulations by reference to the agency’s intent or
purpose. It then evaluates intentionalist and purposivist approaches
against various criteria: the need to constrain judicial discretion,
comparative institutional competencies between agencies and courts,
and the minimization of strategic agency incentives to subvert
rulemaking procedures. Part II then explores the rationales for a
textualist theory, but rejects a plain-meaning approach based solely
on the regulatory text and linguistic sources. Instead, it proposes a
method based on sources most likely to shed light on the rule’s public
meaning as authorized by politically accountable actors. Finally, Part
III asks how and when a court should defer to an agency’s
construction of an ambiguous provision and concludes that deference
is due when the agency provides a sufficiently reasoned explanation.
I. JUDICIAL REGULATORY INTERPRETATION
Regulatory interpretation requires judges to choose among
competing interpretive methods based on considerations unique to
19
the rulemaking process. The most well-developed scholarly
approaches currently advocate some version of intentionalism or
purposivism. The resulting debate features nuanced disagreements
20
about the appropriate goals and sources of regulatory interpretation.
19. A judge could be a purposivist in statutory interpretation based on one set of reasons,
for example, but a textualist in regulatory interpretation (or vice versa), due to a distinctive set
of concerns. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 689 (1996) (“[I]mportant differences
between the regulatory and legislative processes offer agencies the opportunity to produce
explanatory materials that courts may consult in ascertaining regulatory meaning.”); Stack,
supra note 9, at 361 (arguing that “a theory of regulatory interpretation must be grounded in the
distinctive character of regulations and the institutions that issue them”).
20. See Stack, supra note 9, at 358 (“We lack a debate over, much less an account of, the
basic elements of regulatory interpretation, including ‘the overall goal of interpretation,’ ‘the
admissible sources the interpreter may consider in attempting to achieve that goal,’ and the
relationships among those sources.”); id. at 377 (noting that “two key elements in a theory of
legal interpretation” include “the privileged sources of interpretation” as well as the “goals” of
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Though applying labels to these proposed methods can be hazardous
21
given their overlapping premises, labels can nonetheless help to
22
highlight the stakes involved. This Part critically examines this
debate and concludes that both purposivism and intentionalism are
23
ultimately ill-suited to judicial regulatory interpretation.
A. Competing Approaches
Despite the fact that regulations overwhelm statutes in number
24
and scope, neither judges nor scholars have confronted regulations

interpretation); cf. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP R. FRICKRY & ELIZABETH GARRETT,
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 219 (2006) (distinguishing “between the
overall goal of instated or implied, of the ends, aims, or goals of statutory interpretation” as well
as “[w]hat sources are admissible” and whether “those sources [should] be arranged in some
hierarchy and consulted sequentially”).
21. See, e.g., John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 70, 75 (2006) (acknowledging that “textualism and purposivism do in fact share more
conceptual common ground than textualists . . . have sometimes emphasized”); Jonathan T.
Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006) (arguing that “when
one considers how modern textualists go about identifying textual meaning and how
purposivists go about identifying statutory purposes, the differences between textualism and
purposivism begin to fade”); Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 349 (2005)
(arguing that the differences between textualism and purposivism “are less categorical than
either textualists or their critics generally acknowledge”); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable
Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 117, 125 (2009) (referring to “the
accommodationists” that have “focused on similarities among, rather than differences between,
the rival methods” of textualism and intentionalism).
22. Cf. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1832 (2010)
(“Labels are unfortunately important in statutory interpretation.”). This insight is particularly
true when specified with attention to an authors’ own self-characterizations.
23. Importantly, the focus here is on how judges—as opposed to agencies with different
institutional competencies—should engage in regulatory interpretation. Cf. Jerry L. Mashaw,
Agency-Centered or Court-Centered Administrative Law? A Dialogue with Richard Pierce on
Agency Statutory Interpretation, 59 ADMIN L. REV. 889, 889–93 (2007); Jerry L. Mashaw,
Between Facts and Norms: Agency Statutory Interpretation as an Autonomous Enterprise, 55 U.
TORONTO L.J. 497, 497–501 (2005); Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge is Not the Primary Official
with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 321–22 (1990). But see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., How Agencies Should
Give Meaning to the Statutes They Administer: A Response to Mashaw and Strauss, 59 ADMIN. L.
REV. 197, 197–205 (2007). Relatedly, some argue that administrative agencies are better situated
(and more likely) to interpret statutes purposively, while courts are better suited to apply
textualist premises. This Article argues that such arguments are even stronger when it comes to
the agencies’ interpretation of their own regulations. See VERMEULE, supra note 18, at 111;
Michael Herz, Purposivism and Institutional Competence in Statutory Interpretation, 2009 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 89, 92; Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 18, at 928.
24. See KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 12, at 13–21 (documenting increase since the
1970s in number of rules and pages in the Federal Register far exceeding that of statutory texts);
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with the level of interpretive sophistication applied to constitutions,
25
statutes, or contracts. Instead, most judicial approaches can best be
26
described as erratic; worse, some judges blithely apply statutory27
interpretation methods to regulations without any reflection at all.
Previous precedents themselves provide inconsistent guidance. On
the one hand, some call for courts to consult the “plain words” of the
28
regulation’s text when interpreting it. Other courts have instead
looked to the “Secretary’s intent at the time of the regulation’s
promulgation” and have consulted an array of materials such as
versions of the regulation over time, interpretations of other agencies
29
with similar words in their regulations, and public comments.
Noah, supra note 9, at 259 (noting the “far greater prevalence of legislative rules issued by
agencies than by Congress”).
25. See, e.g., Noah, supra note 9, at 258–59 (noting that “[a] few scholars have applied
insights gleaned from the intense debate over methods of statutory interpretation to other texts
having the same force and effect as legislation” but that “[t]he same interpretative issues
involving legislative rules promulgated by administrative agencies have gone largely
unnoticed”); Stack, supra note 9, at 357 (“While all agree that regulations are primary sources of
law, strikingly little attention has been devoted to the method of their interpretation.”); Russell
L. Weaver, Judicial Interpretation of Administrative Regulation: The Deference Rule, 45 U. PITT.
L. REV. 587, 589 (1984) (“Although commentators have lavished attention on the subject of
statutory construction, they have virtually ignored the problem of how to interpret
regulations.”).
26. See Stack, supra note 9, at 359 (observing that “courts have not developed a consistent
approach to regulatory interpretation”); id. at 376 (noting that decisions involving regulatory
interpretation exhibit an “ad hoc quality”); Weaver, supra note 9, at 683 (“Courts have not . . .
evolved a uniform interpretive theory to apply to regulations.”).
27. See Frank C. Newman, How Courts Interpret Regulations, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 509, 509–
10 (1947) (observing that “lawyers have often treated regulations as statutes, particularly when
interpretive questions arise”); Stack, supra note 9, at 368–70 (noting that “courts rely on
principles of statutory interpretation without pausing or commenting on the justification for
applying those principles to regulations and without situating their approach in relation to other
decisions in which courts have construed regulations”); Weaver, supra note 9, at 682 (“Most
courts assume that regulations should be interpreted using principles of statutory
construction.”); see also, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644,
669 (2007) (applying statutory “canon against implied repeals” to regulation); Rucker v.
Wabash R.R., 418 F.2d 146, 149 (7th Cir. 1969) (citing II SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4007 (3d ed. 1943)) (“Administrative regulations, like statutes,
must be construed by courts, and the same rules of interpretation are applicable in both cases.”).
28. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945); see also Chase Bank
USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 562 U.S. 195, 203–08 (2011); Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576,
586–88 (2000); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala,
512 U.S. 504, 514 (1994); Sec’y of Labor v. W. Fuels-Utah, Inc., 900 F.2d 318, 321 (D.C. Cir.
1990).
29. See, e.g., Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988); In re Transcon Lines, 89 F.3d
559, 567 (9th Cir. 1996); SSM Rehab. Inst. v. Shalala, 68 F.3d 266, 269–71 (8th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Boynton, 63 F.3d 337, 342, 344 (4th Cir. 1995); Knapp Shoes, Inc. v. Sylvania Shoe Mfg.
Corp., 640 N.E.2d 1101, 1105 (Mass. 1994).
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One likely explanation for this interpretive lethargy is the
30
decades-long influence of Bowles v. Seminole Rock, which gives
“controlling weight” to an agency interpretation so long as it is not
31
“plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Accordingly,
the judge is called upon first to interpret the regulation to determine
whether it is indeed “plainly erroneous” or otherwise “inconsistent”
with the agency’s interpretation; only then should she consider
32
deferring to the agency’s construction. In practice, however, many
judges have understood their review of an agency’s interpretation of
its own regulations as requiring more deference than that granted to
33
an agency’s interpretation of a statute. As a result, some judges have
avoided the interpretive inquiry altogether, or else halfheartedly
gestured toward tools drawn from the statutory context before simply
34
capitulating to the agency’s view. The effect is that the
overwhelming majority of cases of regulatory interpretation have
35
resulted in an agency victory.
More recently, however, some academics and several members
of the Supreme Court have begun to question such practices and have

30. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
31. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414. Seminole
Rock deference is also sometimes referred to as Auer deference, though this Article will only
refer to the former for consistency’s sake. See Stack, supra note 9, at 371 (“The most obvious
place to turn for assistance with regulatory interpretation is the long-standing doctrine that an
agency’s construction of its own regulation is controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation,” a doctrine “referred to as Seminole Rock deference.”).
32. Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414.
33. See, e.g., Cathedral Candle Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 400 F.3d 1352, 1363–64
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is broader than
deference to the agency’s construction of a statute, because in the latter case the agency is
addressing Congress’ intentions, while in the former it is addressing its own.” (citing Am.
Express Co. v. United States, 262 F.3d 1376, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2001))).
34. See supra note 27; Noah, supra note 9 (noting that courts “frequently deflect[] the
[interpretive] task altogether by simply deferring to an agency’s post-promulgation
interpretation”); Stack, supra note 9, at 369 (“Even when the interpretation of a regulation
receives explicit attention, an uncanny detachment characterizes the interpretive exercise:
courts rely on principles of statutory interpretation without pausing or commenting on the
justification for applying those principles to regulations . . . .”).
35. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J.
1083, 1099 (2008) (observing a 90.9 percent agency win rate in a dataset of Seminole Rock cases
from 1983 to 2005); Richard J. Pierce, Jr. & Joshua Weiss, An Empirical Study of Judicial
Review of Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 515, 519 (2011)
(determining that lower courts applying Auer and Seminole Rock upheld agency interpretations
about 76 percent of the time in a sample of district and circuit court cases from January 1, 1999
to December 31, 2001, and from January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2007).
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noted the need for independent interpretive principles to govern
36
regulatory texts. Much of their hesitation about the current state of
affairs stems from the sense that an unreflective rule of deference has
facilitated tenuous agency interpretations at the expense of fair notice
37
and process. As a result, some scholars have advanced freestanding
theories of regulatory interpretation, the most developed of which are
currently either intentionalist or purposivist in orientation, though
38
some have begun to consider textualist accounts as well.
Professor Kevin Stack, for example, has recently advanced a
sophisticated interpretive method that he calls “regulatory
39
purposivism.” Regulatory purposivism adapts Hart and Sacks’s
40
statutory legal process theory to the rulemaking context. Because
administrative law “requires regulators to act as reasonable persons,
pursuing reasonable purposes within the permissible range of their
41
discretion,” Stack argues that the role of the judge is to interpret a

36. See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213 (2015) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (advocating that Auer deference be “abandon[ed]”); id. at 1219 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (arguing that “the entire line of precedent beginning with Seminole Rock raises
serious constitutional questions and should be reconsidered”); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr.,
133 S. Ct. 1326, 1338 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (noting that “[i]t may be appropriate to
reconsider [Auer and Seminole Rock] in an appropriate case”); Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel.
Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (announcing that “while I have in the
past uncritically accepted [the Auer] rule, I have become increasingly doubtful of its validity”);
Michael P. Healy, The Past, Present and Future of Auer Deference: Mead, Form and Function in
Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Regulations, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 633, 635 (2014)
(arguing for a nondeferential standard of review of regulatory interpretation); Manning, supra
note 19, at 617 (arguing “that the Justices’ new doubts about Seminole Rock are well founded,
and that the Court should replace Seminole Rock with a standard that imposes an independent
judicial check on the agency’s determination of regulatory meaning”).
37. See, e.g., Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1341 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(noting that “when an agency interprets its own rules . . . the power to prescribe is augmented
by the power to interpret; and the incentive is to speak vaguely and broadly, so as to retain a
‘flexibility’ that will enable ‘clarification’ with retroactive effect”); Christopher v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2168 (2012) (expressing concern that strong judicial deference
“creates a risk that agencies will promulgate vague and open-ended regulations that they can
later interpret as they see fit, thereby ‘frustrat[ing] the notice and predictability purposes of
rulemaking’” (quoting Talk Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2254)).
38. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 19, at 659 (“Detailed consideration of the relative
legitimacy and utility of particular approaches to textual construction is for another day.”).
39. See Stack, supra note 9, at 363.
40. See id. (defending “a purposive method of regulatory interpretation modeled on Hart
and Sacks’s approach to statutory interpretation”); Kevin M. Stack, The Interpretive Dimension
of Seminole Rock, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 669, 684 (2015) (further developing purposivist
approach); cf. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
41. Stack, supra note 9, at 397.
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rule consistently with its statement of basis and purpose, otherwise
42
known as the rule’s preamble. In his view, the statement of basis and
purpose is not only a product of the rulemaking process, but also
43
anchors the rule’s validity. As such, both the regulatory text and
statement of basis and purpose should be understood as part of the
same “regulatory act,” much like an enacted statutory statement of
44
purpose. Stack accordingly calls for judges to consider the text with
reference to the agency’s own understanding of its policy goals as
reflected in “the rationale, objectives, and limits of the regulation”
45
provided in the preamble. This approach, he argues, has numerous
virtues including promoting judicial deference to the agency’s own
46
“authoritative statement” of its aims, providing notice to regulated
47
entities, optimizing the balance between agency flexibility and
48
predictability, as well as reducing the possibility for “strategic
49
manipulation” by agencies.
Purposive approaches like Stack’s generally recognize that
rulemaking agencies may not be able to foresee every situation in
which the regulation should be applied nor anticipate every changed
circumstance. Thus, the judge should attempt to implement what the
50
enacting agency was initially attempting to achieve. Proponents
divide, however, as to the appropriate sources judges should consider
to discern that purpose. For example, unlike Stack’s exclusive focus
on the text and preamble, Professor Russell Weaver’s purposivism

42. Id. at 392 (arguing that “a goal of regulatory interpretation is to implement the purpose
or aim of the regulation, and that the privileged interpretive sources are the regulatory text and
accompanying statement of basis and purpose”); see also Kevin M. Stack, How to Interpret a
Regulation: First Principles, REGBLOG (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.regblog.org/2013/02/11/11stack-regulation-interpretation [http://perma.cc/9V8S-8MED].
43. See Stack, supra note 9, at 380 (“[T]he statement of basis and purpose is not only joined
to the text of the rule as the other principal product of the rulemaking proceeding, but it also
provides the grounds for the validity of the rule.”).
44. See id. at 395.
45. Id. at 398.
46. See id. (arguing that his purposive approach “allocates a strong form of judicial
deference, in the sense of judicial acceptance, to the agency’s own authoritative statement of the
rationale, objectives, and limits of the regulation”).
47. Id. at 401 (noting that approach “avoids the central objections that textualists have
made to purposivism, including . . . problems of fair notice”).
48. See id. at 414–16.
49. Id. at 416.
50. See Noah, supra note 9, at 264–65 (noting that “[p]roponents of dynamic interpretation
start with the static text but strive to effectuate the purpose of the legislation and adapt it as
necessary to deal with changed circumstances”).
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welcomes a broader array of interpretive materials. Although he
agrees that the text and preamble provide the best evidence of an
51
agency’s regulatory objectives, Weaver argues that such sources can
be indeterminate. Thus, he also invites judges to reference the
“nature of the regulatory scheme,” the notice of proposed
rulemaking, internal agency documents and memoranda,
environmental impact statements, cost-benefit analyses, testimony by
52
agency drafters, and canons of construction, among other materials.
Intentionalist approaches, by contrast, focus more heavily on the
specific factual scenarios originally considered by the agency enacting
the regulation. In this sense, proponents of intentionalism like
Professor Lars Noah are more wary of the dangers of “dynamic”
interpretation by judges “empowered to effectuate” the rule’s
“purpose and adapt it as necessary to deal with changed
53
circumstances.” Intentionalists are thus more eager to confine
judicial regulatory interpretation to the actual circumstances initially
considered by the agency as opposed to what judges perceive as the
regulation’s broader objectives.
One goal of this approach is to rein in the judge’s ability to adapt
a regulation to new facts at higher levels of generality. As a result,
Noah’s “original intent” approach privileges what the enacting agency
54
explicitly considered in the record. Specifically, he first points to the
final rule’s preamble as the “best” evidence of original intent, noting
that such preambles have become more detailed as judicial scrutiny of
55
them has increased over time. He then presents a hierarchy of other
sources appropriate for the task, including regulatory analyses,
51. Weaver, supra note 9, at 696 (“To the extent that a regulation is ‘purposive,’ it is
because an agency acted ‘purposively’ in creating it . . . . This fact is reflected in the APA, which
requires that every final rule promulgated during an informal rulemaking set forth its ‘basis and
purpose.’’’); see id. at 698 (“The relevant purposes, whether immediate or ulterior, are those
held by the agency . . . . In the informal rulemaking process, the agency typically will state the
‘purpose’—the primary ulterior purpose—of the regulation in a document accompanying the
final rule.”); see also id. at 711 (stating that, as he had “noted above,” “the preamble to the final
rule must contain a ‘concise statement [of its] basis and purpose’”(alteration in original)).
52. See id.at 709–21.
53. Noah, supra note 9, at 264–65.
54. See id. at 260.
55. Id. at 306 (observing that “when they do inquire about the agency’s original intent,
courts usually refer only to the preamble accompanying the final rule, which represents the best
but hardly only useful source of guidance”); id. at 309–10 (noting that “[a]s courts became more
demanding in their substantive review of rules adopted through notice-and-comment
procedures . . . [p]reambles for especially controversial rules may respond in detail to public
comments in anticipation of defending against a judicial challenge”).
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notices of proposed rulemaking, internal agency memoranda, and
56
even the “recollections” of those involved in the rule’s formulation.
B. Evaluating Intentionalism and Purposivism
Both intentionalism and purposivism, however, fall prey to a
number of regulation-specific worries that ultimately counsel against
their adoption. These concerns include the court’s inability to locate
regulatory intent or purpose consistently, the comparative
competencies between agencies and courts, and the general potential
for strategic interpretive behavior by rulemaking agencies.
Accordingly, one way to understand the relevant problem is in terms
of determining which interpretive method is likely to best balance or
57
trade off among these various considerations.
1. The Identification Problem. Legal realists and public choice
theorists alike have effectively undermined the notion that
multimember institutions like administrative agencies possess a
58
singular, identifiable intent or purpose. In this view, it is unlikely for
the myriad actors involved in the regulatory process to possess some
collective intent when issuing a regulation, and even less likely that
judges could discover this intent, even if it existed. This insight is
perhaps most straightforward as applied to independent agencies

56. Id. at 307; see also id. at 320–21 (discussing how “agency officials may have to testify
about their decisionmaking where necessary to provide a record for judicial review”).
57. Given that optimizing over all of these dimensions may be impossible due to resourcerelated or other constraints, the search may ultimately be for second-best interpretive solutions.
See VERMEULE, supra note 18, at 80–81 (arguing that it “is impossible to derive interpretive
rules directly from first-best principles without answering second-best questions about
institutional performance”); Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating
Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 256 (when interpreting statutes, turning
attention “to the contingent optimality of sub-optimizing decision procedures, and to the
circumstances in which the second-best is the best we can do”).
58. See Noah, supra note 9, at 280–81 (“Much like the criticized fiction of a discoverable
legislative intent, the notion of a single and authoritative administrative intent encounters some
conceptual difficulties” such as the fact that “[m]any agency officials may have a hand in the
formulation of a legislative rule” and with “multi-member commissions, these problems become
still trickier.”); Stack, supra note 9, at 401 (“Relying on public choice theory, textualists argue
that legislation frequently lacks a purpose other than that ascertainable in the text.”); cf.
KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 22–24 (2d ed. 1963); Herz,
supra note 23, at 94–104; Saul Levmore, Ambiguous Statutes, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1075–76
(2010); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 869–72 (1930); Kenneth A.
Shepsle, Congress is a ‘They,’ Not an ‘It’: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 239, 239 (1992).
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headed by multimember commissions or boards. Individual
commissioners may vote for a regulation for any number of reasons—
to change a policy, to curry favor with a colleague, or to appease a
potential future employer. Thus, to impute some subjective intent to
their aggregate vote would indulge a legal fiction; legal fictions, in
turn, can foster judicial creativity.
Perhaps less obviously, the concern is also relevant to singleheaded executive agencies, particularly those required by executive
order to submit significant regulations to the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) for review. Although the hierarchical
structure of such agencies renders the notion of intent more
60
plausible, the concept is complicated by the realities of the OIRAcoordinated review process. The interactions between the agency
head and White House actors can result in changes to a regulation
that render it difficult for an external actor, like a judge, to separate
the subjective intent of the agency head from other members of the
61
President’s administration. An agency head signing off on a
regulation could have a different intent than that of the President or
OIRA administrator because of bureaucratic capture, her
relationship with Congress, or diverging amounts of information and
62
expertise. Although some might argue that it should be the intent of
63
the statutory delegate that should ultimately matter, others would
point out that, even still, the lines between the intent of the agency
59. See Noah, supra note 9, at 280–81 (noting difficulties of discerning intent from
multimember commissions)
60. See id. at 281 (noting that a “hierarchical structure and duty of explanation
distinguishes all administrative agencies from the collective decisionmaking process of a
legislature”).
61. See Lisa Heinzerling, Who Will Run the EPA?, 30 YALE J. ON REG. ONLINE 39, 39
(2013) (noting that through the “longstanding practice of White House control over EPA
rules . . . EPA rules deemed major by OMB are not issued without OMB’s imprimatur,” thus
allowing “the OMB director [to] become the EPA Administrator’s boss”).
62. See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1302–03 (2006); Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence,
Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 167, 169 (1990).
63. Cf. Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 263, 267 (2006) (arguing that “as a matter of statutory construction the
President has directive authority—that is, the power to act directly under the statute or to bind
the discretion of lower level officials—only when the statute expressly grants power to the
President in name”). But see Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV.
2245, 2319–31 (2001). This is, of course, not to confuse a potential extension of Stack’s views on
presidential directive authority with his views on regulatory interpretation, which are discussed
in more detail here.
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head and the President are often blurred in practice. Such worries
would be compounded by the wealth of regulatory history upon
which some, like Noah, would allow judges to rely as evidence of
agency intent. The broader the palette from which the judge can
draw, the more convincing the resulting picture.
Confronted with these concerns, some intentionalists and
purposivists would respond that what is important is not the
subjective intent of particular regulatory actors, but rather the
agency’s objective intent or purpose. Stack makes this argument
perhaps more forcefully, recall, contending that judges should
attempt to discern the objective public purpose of the agency as
65
found in the rule’s statement of basis and purpose. In his view, such
statements are akin to “enacted statement[s] of purpose in a statute”
in that they have been “duly agreed-upon” by actors within the
66
agency. The preamble can thus be thought of as part of the
regulatory text, which has also gone through the appropriate
67
authorizing procedures. As a result, the judge has a readily available
source from which to identify the rule’s explicit official purpose, thus
mitigating the criticism that a search for regulatory purpose is an
incoherent and ultimately fruitless exercise.
Though Stack convincingly demonstrates that regulatory
purposivism is more immune to the criticisms often leveled at
statutory purposivism, he has not rebutted them sufficiently to
counsel full-scale adoption. First, his attempt to analogize agency
statements of basis and purpose to enacted statutory statements of
purpose fails to leave conceptual room for statements of purpose that
are actually codified into the regulatory text itself—a more precise
64. See Peter L. Strauss, Foreword: Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in
Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 704 (2007) (“The difference between
oversight and decision can be subtle, particularly when the important transactions occur behind
closed doors and among political compatriots who value loyalty and understand that the
President who selected them is their democratically chosen leader.”); Cass R. Sunstein, The
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838,
1874 n.126 (2013) (noting “[t]here is a great deal of academic discussion about whether the
President may ‘overrule’ those within the executive branch, including Cabinet heads, who may
be delegated a degree of statutory discretion” but arguing that the “issue has more theoretical
interest than practical importance” since “those who work for the President want to act
consistently with his goals, priorities, and views”).
65. See Stack, supra note 9, at 361–62.
66. Id. at 402.
67. Id.; see also id. at 407 (“In a sense, the suggestion is that both regulatory text and the
regulation’s statement of basis and purpose count as part of the ‘text’ on which a textualist
should center her interpretive inquiry.”).
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analogy. Indeed, agencies often place statements of purpose directly
into the codified regulatory text to clarify the purpose of the
regulation beyond the general, abstract language found in the APA68
required statement of basis and purpose. In these circumstances, the
judge is once again confronted with the problem of how to choose
among competing statements of purpose.
Second, as a descriptive matter, agencies often list multiple
purposes in their preambles, both in the general introductory
language as well as in the particular provision-by-provision
explanations. Sometimes, these various stated objectives will track the
69
multiple perceived goals of the authorizing statute. They could also
reflect the agency’s attempt to trade off between many conflicting
considerations or, more generally, to balance various benefits and
70
costs. Though administrative-law doctrines undoubtedly “press”
71
agencies to rationalize regulations, the rulemaking process is
frequently dominated by rent-seeking interest groups that often
72
succeed in wresting concessions from captured administrators.
68. See, e.g., Standards for Accredited Veterinarians, 51 Fed. Reg. 45,874, 45,876 (Dec. 23,
1986) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 161) (presenting “Statement of Purpose” as part of the
regulatory text); Assessment of Mediation and Arbitration Procedures, 78 Fed. Reg. 29,071,
29,080 (May 17, 2013) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 1108) (same).
69. See STACK, supra note 12, at 36 (“Rather than providing an independent assessment of
the purpose of the rule in light of the statute, some preambles state the purpose of their
regulations in terms that largely mirror statutory language.”); see, e.g., Applications for FDA
Approval to Market a New Drug: Patent Listing Requirements and Application of 30-Month
Stays on Approval of Abbreviated New Drug Applications Certifying That a Patent Claiming a
Drug Is Invalid or Will Not be Infringed, 67 Fed. Reg. 65,448, 65,459 (Oct. 24, 2002) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314) (noting that the rule had “multiple objectives” that attempted to
“preserv[e] the balance struck in the Hatch-Waxman Amendments between encouraging
innovation and encouraging the availability of generic drugs”).
70. See, e.g., Food Labeling; Health Messages and Label Statements; Reproposed Rule, 55
Fed. Reg. 5176, 5178–79 (Feb. 13, 1990) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101) (describing the
rules as “intended to help achieve . . . multiple objectives” and strike the right “balance”
between the various goals of preventing consumer misleading, protecting the public health, as
well as ensuring equal treatment of all competitors); Standards for Remedial Actions at Inactive
Uranium Processing Sites, 48 Fed. Reg. 590, 590 (Jan. 5, 1983) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
192) (“We have therefore made it our objective to establish standards that take account of the
tradeoffs between costs and benefits in a way that assures adequate protection of the public
health, safety, and the environment; that can be implemented using presently available
techniques and measuring instruments; and that are reasonable in terms of overall costs and
benefits.”).
71. Stack, supra note 9, at 403.
72. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe the Plummer”: The Sausage-Making of
Financial Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 58–59 (2013) (finding that financial institutions and
trade groups dominated early meetings with the agencies responsible for implementation of the
Dodd-Frank Act); Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information

NOU IN PRINTER-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

98

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

9/15/2015 10:56 PM

[Vol. 65:81

Administrators can nonetheless still justify the resulting regulation as
a reasonable effort to balance a number of statutorily authorized
considerations. As a result, a judge could characterize the purpose of
a regulation or a specific provision in many different ways, all of
73
which seem consistent with the regulatory preamble.
Finally, given that rulemaking preambles contain both abstract
statements of purpose as well as provision-by-provision descriptions,
there are also still-remaining questions of how to relate the specific
74
justifications to the more general. Should the general provisions be
used when only the specific justifications are otherwise ambiguous?
Should the specific explanations always be read in light of the broader
statements of purpose, in which case the latter could potentially
expand the relevant level of generality? In this manner, purposivism
suffers from an identification problem and the resulting risk that a
judge will invoke a regulation’s purpose to implement a favored
policy preference.
2. Institutional Capacity. Intentionalism and purposivism will
also increase decision costs—the time and resources required for
judges to engage in regulatory interpretation—as well as the risk of
interpretive errors, the probability that an interpretation will be
75
flawed. Indeed, approaches that invite judges to consult a capacious
array of sources will require higher decision costs relative to more
restrictive interpretive methods, since rulemaking records are usually
voluminous. They are replete with documents on narrow subjects
Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1333–34 (2010) (“Even when agency staff can withstand the
technical minutia coming at them at high speed and under tight time constraints, they face an
administrative record that is badly lopsided, and threats of lawsuits against the substance of
their regulation that come predominantly from only one sector (industry).”).
73. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV.
405, 428 (1989) (“In some cases, the purpose might be characterized in many ways, all of which
are faithful to the original enactment. The act of characterization is therefore one of invention
rather than discovery.”).
74. Stack, supra note 9, at 405–06 (stating that “[t]o the extent that a statement of basis and
purpose typically includes both a general statement of the purpose of the regulation as well as
provision-by-provision justifications they will inform the level of generality of the regulation or
its particular provisions” but acknowledging that “[i]nterpretive work will remain”).
75. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 123–50 (1994); VERMEULE, supra note 18, at 129–30;
Stack, supra note 9, at 403 (discussing considerations related to the “distinctive risks of error for
time-pressed generalist judges”); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953,
972–73 (1995); Emerson H. Tiller & Pablo T. Spiller, Strategic Instruments: Legal Structure and
Political Games in Administrative Law, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 349, 351 (1999); Adrian
Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 129–30 (2000).
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likely unfamiliar to the generalist judge: staff memoranda, proposed
rules, the final regulatory text, advisory committee hearings,
regulatory and environmental impact analyses, preambles, public
76
comments, presidential statements, and more. Some of these
materials appear early in the rulemaking process, but are later
superseded. Some reflect views that have been outright rejected by
77
authoritative decision makers. These institutional dynamics are
likely to be difficult for judges (or other outsiders) to appreciate,
especially if they have never worked in an administrative agency.
Intentionalist and purposivist approaches also create more
opportunities for judicial error because they ask judges to engage in
inquiries for which they are ill-suited. Specifically, both
methodologies require judges to determine whether the current
agency’s action indeed furthers the agency’s implied or stated
objective. These decisions require knowledge and data about the
expected consequences of the challenged agency action—information
which judges are unlikely to have access to, let alone be equipped to
evaluate competently. As a result, these approaches ask judges to
engage in a form of means-end reasoning that implicates complicated
78
questions of fact and policy judgments that stretch beyond the kinds
of determinations that judges should make.
Judges, like all interpreters, have fixed resource constraints as
well as limited institutional capacities. By contrast to agency actors,
judges are generalists who lack the training and resources to gather
and analyze large amounts of data or otherwise adapt regulatory
policies to new circumstances. In addition, the judge may also have to
determine questions of degree: would granting the permit advance
the purpose of the regulation to the same extent as the initial
rulemaking contemplated and, if not, how much more or less, and

76. See Noah, supra note 9, at 306–21 (surveying examples of regulatory history).
77. See San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 789 F.2d
26, 33–34 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (rejecting staff documents as interpretive sources for a Nuclear
Regulatory Commission rule on the grounds that the agency’s commission was “required to
make its own [authoritative] finding”).
78. See Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741,
758 (1993) (arguing that “[m]eans-ends rationality should play a large role in law . . . for
example, legislatures and judges should anticipate the effects of their decisions on, among other
things, the allocation and distribution of resources,” but also noting that “[c]onventional legal
tools are ill-suited to this task”); cf. Herz, supra note 23, at 99 (regarding statutory
interpretation, observing that “even if there is such a thing as an identifiable legislative purpose,
courts are ill-equipped to determine which interpretation of a statute will most effectively
advance that purpose”).
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what amount is acceptable? As courts have observed in the statutory
79
context, “no legislation pursues its purposes at all costs.” The same
is true of regulations.
Such error and decision costs are likely to be exacerbated by the
fact that judges also face a number of other epistemic constraints
unique to the regulatory context. Under the Freedom of Information
Act, for instance, predecisional and deliberative materials within
80
administrative agencies are protected from disclosure. Agencies do
not routinely publish internal staff memoranda and messages,
81
although they can be placed voluntarily into the regulatory docket.
Judicial doctrines also shield agency interactions with the White
82
House. Although executive orders require agencies to “make
available to the public all documents exchanged between OIRA and
the agency during the review by OIRA,” the provision is not robustly
83
followed or enforced in practice. The disclosure requirements also
only apply after the final rule has been published in the Federal
Register and exclude any communications before the formal review
84
process begins. As a result, any judicial inquiry into an agency’s
actual intent or purpose is likely to be stymied by the limited kinds of
information available in the rulemaking record.
Relatedly, judges must often examine the materials that do make
it into the record without the knowledge required to comprehend that
agency’s specific procedural idiosyncrasies. Some agencies, for
example, use different naming practices to denote various stages in
the rulemaking process. The Department of Treasury, for instance,
labels general-authority regulations as “interpretative rules,” even
though they are legally binding and thus “legislative” in
administrative law terminology, a quirk that has caused a great deal

79. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525–26 (1987) (per curiam) (“[N]o
legislation pursues its purposes at all costs.”); see also David M. Driesen, Purposeless
Construction, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 97, 148 (2013) (“The Court has offered plausible
reasons to give statutory goals little weight in statutory construction cases. Congress never
pursues its goals to the exclusion of all competing considerations.”).
80. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1994).
81. Noah, supra note 9, at 320.
82. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 403, 406–08 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that
courts could determine only whether an agency decision was supported by its public record and
explanation, and not by the agency’s informal ex parte deliberations with the White House).
83. See Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making,
108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1148–54, 1164 (2010).
84. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(4)(D), 3 C.F.R. 638, 645 (1993).
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of jurisprudential confusion in tax litigation. Such confusion is only
augmented by the technical jargon and acronyms that litter the
rulemaking landscape, spurring one recent, frustrated D.C. Circuit
panel to issue an order to parties to “submit briefs that eliminate
86
uncommon acronyms used on their previously filed briefs.” Broad
consultation of the rulemaking record also raises aggregate litigation
costs as parties will be forced to grapple with voluminous
administrative materials and to rebut evidence drawn from them. The
resulting strategic presentations of the records, in turn, will be costly
for judges to independently evaluate and sort.
To be sure, some of these institutional concerns are mitigated for
specialized courts like the D.C. Circuit, which has more experience
reading regulatory materials than other circuits and thus may require
less effort to comb through rulemaking records. Even then, at least in
recent years, the D.C. Circuit has only heard about 40 percent of
cases involving agency review, still leaving 60 percent to be heard by
87
less-experienced courts.
Moreover, agency personnel and
procedures are constantly evolving alongside technological or other
substantive policy changes, thus mitigating the benefits of
specialization over time.
3. Strategic Self-Delegation. Finally, competing theories of
regulatory interpretation should also consider the extent to which
alternative approaches can reduce the ability of agencies to
88
strategically self-delegate rulemaking power. In particular, as
Professor John Manning has emphasized, two aspects of

85. See Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack of)
Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1727, 1761–73 (2007) (providing examples).
86. See Order, Ill. Pub. Telecoms. Ass’n v. FCC, 752 F.3d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 131059), http://www.scribd.com/doc/214437589/Ipta-v-Fcc-Order [http://perma.cc/PP6S-GCPZ].
87. Douglas H. Ginsburg, Remarks Upon Receiving the Lifetime Service Award of the
Georgetown Federalist Society Chapter, 10 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 3 (2012) (“[P]etitions for
review of administrative decisions filed in the D.C. Circuit have increased from twenty-eight
percent of the national total in 1986 to a high of thirty-eight percent in 2007 and thirty-six
percent in 2010.”); John M. Golden, The Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit: Comparative
Trials of Two Semi-Specialized Courts, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 553, 553 n.2 (2010); John G.
Roberts, Jr., What Makes the D.C. Circuit Different? A Historical View, 92 VA. L. REV. 375,
376–77 (2006).
88. See Manning, supra note 19, at 657 (stating that “if an agency issues an imprecise or
vague regulation, it does so secure in the knowledge that it can insist upon an unobvious
interpretation, so long as its choice is not ‘plainly erroneous’”); Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri
Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1449, 1460–61 (2011).
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administrative law currently facilitate an agency’s ability to draft
intentionally ambiguous regulatory texts with the hopes of refining or
89
changing its regulatory policies with minimal judicial oversight. First,
the APA exempts “interpretative rules” and “general statements of
90
policy” from traditional notice-and-comment requirements. These
exempted documents, sometimes referred to as “non-legislative
rules,” often construe agency regulations in manuals or by simple
91
postings on the agency’s website. Although some agencies will
voluntarily engage in some minimal form of public comment before
issuing such documents, most are released without any formal
92
procedure. Second, recall that Seminole Rock affords considerable
deference to the agency’s interpretation of its own regulations. When
an agency interprets a legislative rule that it promulgated, there is
relatively minimal judicial oversight. Because of these two features of
the current legal landscape, the agency faces few ex ante procedural
requirements to issue a regulatory interpretation, as well as a minimal
93
judicial check on the interpretations it issues.
As a result, after an agency promulgates a legislative rule
through notice and comment, it can then continuously revise its
interpretations without meaningful notice to regulated entities and
with little judicial accountability. Such concerns echo the more
constitutionally grounded critiques highlighted by Manning and other

89. See Manning, supra note 19, at 657; Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 88, at 1461
(“Seminole Rock could enable agencies to adopt legally binding norms without either the ex
ante constraint of meaningful procedural safeguards or the ex post check of rigorous judicial
review.”).
90. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012); see also Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 88, at
1460–61 (discussing relevant features of APA).
91. Nonlegislative rules are often also referred to as “guidance documents.” See, e.g., Nina
A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L.
REV. 397, 399 (2007) (“Guidance documents can closely resemble legislative rules, leading some
to call them ‘nonlegislative rules.’”). Legislative rules, in turn, are understood as those required
to undergo notice and comment, whether or not such procedures were actually used. See Robert
A. Anthony, “Interpretive” Rules, “Legislative” Rules and “Spurious” Rules: Lifting the Smog, 8
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 2–3 (1994); David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules,
and the Perils of the Short Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 286 (2010).
92. See, e.g., Lars Noah, The FDA’s New Policy on Guidelines: Having Your Cake and
Eating It Too, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 113, 138 n.100 (1997) (noting FDA’s “voluntary adherence
to notice-and-comment procedures” for its interpretive rules and statements of policy).
93. See Manning, supra note 19, at 618 (“By providing the agency an incentive to
promulgate imprecise and vague rules, Seminole Rock undercuts important deliberative process
objectives of the APA, and it creates potential problems of inadequate notice and arbitrariness
in the enforcement of agency rules.”); Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 88, at 1461.
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legal scholars. Manning’s assessment starts from the premise that
when agencies issue legislative rules, they are engaging in a
95
lawmaking function. Allowing the same agency to then interpret and
apply those rules—what Manning calls “law-exposition”—violates
important separation-of-powers principles that serve to protect
96
against arbitrary coercion. Ensuring that different institutional
actors engage in lawmaking and law-exposition, by contrast, gives
rule writers the incentive to write clear and specific limits on that
97
power. Thus, courts should play a more robust role in policing the
agency’s ability to combine these distinct powers.
To illustrate, consider Decker v. Northwest Environmental
98
Defense Center, a case challenging the EPA’s interpretation of its
own regulation regarding the application of an exception from the
99
Clean Water Act for stormwater discharges alongside logging roads.
100
Suffice to say that the regulatory text was ambiguous. During the
course of litigation, however, the EPA was able to amend the
regulatory text quickly to conform to its litigating position and
provide greater clarity, a fact that Justice Antonin Scalia noted when
101
he declined to defer to the EPA’s interpretation. Specifically, the
lower court handed down an adverse decision in May 2011, but by
December 2012, the EPA had amended the regulations after a full
notice-and-comment process.
Given the backdrop of the APA and Seminole Rock deference,
regulatory interpretation should thus consider the extent to which
competing interpretive approaches can reduce the ability of agencies
to self-delegate strategically. A theory of interpretation should be

94. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 19, at 631–80; see also Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra
note 88, at 1460–61.
95. See Manning, supra note 19, at 655; see also Ariz. Grocery Co. v. Atchinson, T. & Santa
Fe Ry., 284 U.S. 370, 386 (1932) (characterizing a rulemaking agency as a body that “speaks as
the legislature” with “pronouncement[s that have] the force of a statute”).
96. See Manning, supra note 19, at 631 (“By permitting agencies both to write regulations
and to construe them authoritatively, Seminole Rock effectively unifies lawmaking and lawexposition—a combination of powers decisively rejected by our constitutional structure.”).
97. Id. at 647.
98. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013).
99. Id. at 1330–31.
100. See id. at 1334.
101. More specifically, Justice Scalia objected to what he perceived as the agency’s initial
attempt to subvert the notice-and-comment process through interpretation. Id. at 1341–42
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 77 Fed. Reg. 72,974 (Dec. 7, 2012)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122)).
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sensitive to the ways in which it could permit agencies to promulgate
textual “mush,” and then allow such ambiguities to justify later
102
deference. Put in doctrinal terms, different kinds of interpretive
approaches can enlarge or truncate the number of seemingly
“consistent” interpretations later granted “controlling weight” under
Seminole Rock. The more an interpretive approach can reduce the
discretion available to subsequent interpreters, the more it can reduce
103
an agency’s ex ante ability to issue overly broad regulatory texts.
Whether or not intentionalism or purposivism will result in
greater permissible interpretations will depend on many factors,
including both the number of conflicting statements among the
available interpretive sources as well as their respective degrees of
ambiguity. The concern is particularly acute for those interpretive
approaches that invite broad consultation of the regulatory history, as
the modern administrative record often spans different and likely
conflicting administrators and various levels of an agency’s hierarchy.
Although the average rulemaking time currently hovers at just above
104
a year, some regulations, like the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration’s ergonomics rule, have required more than a decade
105
to promulgate. As a result, those documents not shielded by
106
deliberative privilege can often reflect disagreements between
regulatory actors with varying partisan affiliations or otherwise
clashing views of the evidence.
By contrast, the more specific, consistent, and structured the set
of available sources, the less the amount of interpretive leeway. Thus,
Stack’s version of regulatory purposivism, for example, mitigates the
potential for strategic self-delegation relative to broader forms of
102. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 584 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“A
substantive regulation must have sufficient content and definitiveness as to be a meaningful
exercise in agency lawmaking. It is certainly not open to an agency to promulgate mush and
then give it concrete form only through subsequent less formal ‘interpretations.’”).
103. See Stack, supra note 9, at 412 (observing that “[i]f the interpretive approach increases
the requirements for what counts as a permissible construction of the regulation, deference
under Seminole Rock will be triggered less often”).
104. See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking and Political Transitions, 105 NW. U.
L. REV. 471, 513 (2011) (finding that, between the fall of 1983 and the spring of 2010, the
average rulemaking took 462.79 days to complete).
105. See Stuart Shapiro, The Role of Procedural Controls in OSHA’s Ergonomics
Rulemaking, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 688, 691 (2007) (describing OSHA’s efforts to require
employers to reduce musculoskeletal disorders).
106. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1994) (providing an exception to the Freedom of Information Act
for “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law
to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency”).
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intentionalism and purposivism. At the same time, however, his
approach is still subject to the overarching concern that agencies
could attempt to self-delegate by increasing the level of generality at
which judges consider the regulatory text. Specifically, agencies could
choose to insert broad language into the preamble, particularly in the
normally abstract language found in the introduction, or else the
statements of purpose that agencies often place directly into the
codified regulatory text. Though Stack’s approach would consider the
specific provisions to help “inform the level of generality of the
108
regulation or its particular provisions,” it would still require
“synthetic” judgments on the part of the interpreter when relating the
specific to the general provisions, or when more specific provisions
are otherwise unavailable for addressing the particular ambiguity at
109
issue. Thus, reliance on the entire statement of basis and purpose
continues to raise concerns about the ability of agencies to
strategically self-delegate.
II. REGULATORY TEXTUALISM
Because intentionalism and purposivism suffer from
identification problems, misconceive judicial capacities, and fail to
mitigate sufficiently agencies’ abilities to self-delegate, they should be
rejected in favor of a stricter theory more suited to the institutional
capacity of the courts. Such an approach should better cabin judges’
discretion, reduce their decision and error costs, and help to police
substantive policy changes that amount to new legislative rules. One
natural alternative to consider is a method that centers on the
semantic meaning of the regulatory text. This Part examines what
form of textualism is the most appropriate for regulatory
interpretation and why. With its focus on the public understanding of
107. See Stack, supra note 9, at 412 (noting that attention to regulatory interpretation at the
first step of Seminole Rock “clearly reduces the set of permissible interpretations of a
regulation,” while interpreting the regulation in light of the statement of basis and purpose
“does so in a way that enhances fair notice” because “[r]egulated parties and regulatory
beneficiaries have access to the agency’s statements justifying the regulation”); id. at 416
(discussing potential for agencies to engage in “strategic manipulation”).
108. Id. at 405–06.
109. Id. at 403 (acknowledging objections to purposivism’s potential demand for “synthetic
and creative judgment” but arguing that objection does “not apply with the same force to
purposive interpretation of regulation” given greater specificity of preamble); id. at 414–15
(“Because the agency creates the rule’s statement of basis and purpose, it can choose to impose
greater or lesser constraints on the rule’s scope by the way in which it crafts the statement of
basis and purpose.”).
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the words ratified by multiple regulatory actors, textualism rightly
draws the interpreter’s attention to the objective meaning of the
110
Regulatory textualism, as
regulation’s legally binding words.
understood here, also leaves agencies to pursue more intentionalist or
purposivist interpretations through Seminole Rock’s rule of judicial
deference when the regulatory text is otherwise ambiguous.
A. Reassessing the Stakes
Textualism, like intentionalism and purposivism, is best
understood as an interpretive orientation rather than as a reference to
a single method or source. There are, in other words, many textualist
111
Analogizing from the
approaches with family resemblances.
statutory arena, one school of textualists argues that judges should
seek to disambiguate language by discerning the abstract meaning of
every word, despite any conflicting contextual evidence suggesting
more appropriate usages. Such textualists generally search for a
single, correct linguistic meaning, which is self-evident or otherwise
112
“plain.” Because “plain” meaning refers to a text’s semantic
content, judges are often directed to discern such meaning only by
113
reference to dictionaries, textual canons, or other similar tools.
110. Cf. Larry Kramer, Two (More) Problems with Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 907, 910 (2008) (drawing analogy between “public meaning” arguments in statute and
constitutional contexts, which concern “how those [constitutional and statutory] words are or
ought to be understood by the relevant audience”).
111. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 32 (P.M.S. Hacker &
Joachim Schulte eds., G.E.M. Anscombe trans., Wiley-Blackwell rev. 4th ed. 2009) (1953)
(deeming it unnecessary to identify one single feature of a “game” and instead noting that many
instantiations of the term share “family resemblances”); Molot, supra note 21, at 37 (discussing
the intellectual history of textualism as a product of changing “views of judging,” “constitutional
structure,” and whether “law is viewed as indeterminate or determinate”). See generally
Andrew Tutt, Fifty Shades of Textualism, 29 J.L. & POL. 309 (2014).
112. See Frederick Schauer, The Practice and Problems of Plain Meaning: A Response to
Aleinikoff and Shaw, 45 VAND. L. REV. 715, 729–32 (1992).
113. See Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court,
30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275, 280 (1998) (observing that “when the Justices see the statutory language
as unambiguous, textualist opinions . . . refer to ‘plain meaning,’ sometimes citing to dictionaries
to show the meaning is plain, and sometimes simply asserting it as such”); William N. Eskridge,
Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 660 (1990) (“Traditionally, plain meaning
signified that under ordinary principles of grammar and dictionary definitions of its words, the
statutory provision has only one meaning.”); Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the
Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 231 (observing that members
of the Court have “been spending their time reading (Noah) Webster, relying, both in fact and
in articulated justification, on notions of plain meaning”); cf. Noah, supra note 9, at 292 (“In
searching for the plain meaning of a regulation, courts sometimes deploy textualist conventions
such as canons of construction.”).
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As many have recognized, however, such literal approaches are
subject to many of the same objections lodged against intentionalists
and purposivists. Just as textualists attack multimember intent as an
incoherent fiction, for example, so too would intentionalists and
purposivists reject the notion of an objective, linguistic meaning of
114
the regulatory text free of any contact with the interpreter. Instead,
the very nature of language requires the interpreter to consider the
115
text’s context. As a result, textualist judges must inevitably exercise
their own discretion while purporting to rely on semantic meaning
alone. Opportunities for judicial activism thus abound. Judges who
desire a specific outcome, for example, can choose among various
116
textual canons of construction, which Professor Karl Llewellyn
famously demonstrated could be selectively used to reach
117
diametrically opposed results. Judges also introduce selection biases
118
The
by choosing inconsistently among different dictionaries.
empirical evidence regarding which method—intentionalism,
purposivism, or textualism—more effectively constrains the political
119
proclivities of judges is currently mixed at best.
Plain-meaning textualism also unduly introduces a number of
opportunities for interpretive errors in the regulatory context.
Specialized administrative agencies issue legislative rules to

114. Cf. Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal
Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 835–36 (1991) (applying the concept to a statutory
context); Stephen A. Plass, The Illusion and Allure of Textualism, 40 VILL. L. REV. 93, 110, 124–
25 (1995) (same); David A. Strauss, Statutes’ Domains and Judges’ Prerogatives, 77 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1261, 1273 (2010) (same).
115. See Lawrence M. Solan, The New Textualists’ New Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2027,
2050 (2004).
116. See Russell L. Weaver, Challenging Regulatory Interpretations, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 109,
154 (1991).
117. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06 (1950). But see
Sunstein, supra note 73, at 452 (criticizing Llewellyn’s critique as overstated).
118. See Aprill, supra note 113, at 334.
119. Compare James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive
Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2005) (examining a database of 632
workplace-related suits from 1969 to 2003 and arguing that the outcomes of the cases in which
Justices relied on textual canons exclusively “suggest that the canons are regularly used in an
instrumental if not ideologically conscious manner”), with Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated
Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of
Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 95 n.69 (1994) (examining a survey of Chevron decisions and
finding that purposivist courts that rely on “all the traditional tools of statutory construction”
are more likely to “take an active role in determining the meaning of a statute”).

NOU IN PRINTER-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

108

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

9/15/2015 10:56 PM

[Vol. 65:81

implement often complex programs. Consider, for example, the Food
and Drug Administration’s definition of a “color additive”:
A color additive is any material . . . that is a dye, pigment, or other
substance made by a process of synthesis or similar artifice, or
extracted, isolated, or otherwise derived, with or without
intermediate or final change of identity, from a vegetable, animal,
mineral, or other source and that, when added or applied to a food,
drug, or cosmetic or to the human body or any part thereof, is
capable (alone or through reaction with another substance) of
imparting a color thereto . . . . Food ingredients such as cherries,
green or red peppers, chocolate, and orange juice which contribute
their own natural color when mixed with other foods are not
regarded as color additives; but where a food substance such as beet
juice is deliberately used as a color, as in pink lemonade, it is a color
additive . . . . An ingested drug the intended function of which is to
impart color to the human body is a color additive. For the purposes
of this part, the term color includes black, white, and intermediate
grays, but substances including migrants from packaging materials
which do not contribute any color apparent to the naked eye are not
120
color additives.

Regulations are often filled with such technical and industry-specific
jargon that departs from standard dictionary definitions or linguistic
conventions. Several observers have characterized regulatory texts as
“byzantine” and complicated in various substantive areas ranging
from Medicaid and tax regulation to mineral rights and federal
121
contracting.
Dispiritingly, a recent federal statute requiring
executive agencies to use “plain writing” for public documents
122
explicitly excludes regulatory texts. Some evidence in the statutory
context also suggests that textualist approaches are more likely to be
subject to legislative overrides due to interpretive errors; such risks

120. 21 C.F.R. § 70.3 (2013).
121. See Hobbs ex rel. Hobbs v. Zenderman, 579 F.3d 1171, 1186 (10th Cir. 2009)
(characterizing Medicaid regulation as an “extraordinarily complex set of interlocking”
regulations); David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616,
712 (2013) (calling “Federal Acquisition Regulations” a “byzantine set of rules regarding
government contracting”); Edmund L. Andrews, As Profits Soar, Companies Pay U.S. Less for
Gas Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2006), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=980
CE1DA133FF930A15752C0A9609C8B63&smid=pl-share [http://perma.cc/929V-2QN7] (similar
characterization for mineral leasing regulations).
122. Plain Writing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-274, 124 Stat. 2861 § 2(c) (stating that a
“covered document” under the statute “does not include a regulation”).
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are only compounded in the regulatory context given the specialized
123
language often found in legislative rules.
Accordingly, other textualists have increasingly embraced the
notion that textualism need not accept the premise that meaning is an
abstract form awaiting judicial discovery. Instead, they posit that
judges should consult the text’s shared meanings in their appropriate
124
semantic settings. These “new” textualists in the statutory arena
acknowledge the importance of context and thus reject overly
125
wooden, literalist interpretations. In this vein, Professor John
Manning, for example, suggests a textualist approach to regulatory
interpretation that focuses on the “meaning” of the regulatory text as
126
understood in the context of its statement of basis and purpose.
127
Though his account is not yet fully developed, Manning notes that
such texts can be semantically specialized, and that agencies often
123. See Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge Jr., Congressional Overrides of
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1401–04
(2014).
124. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
108–09 (2001) (arguing that modern textualists “believe that statutory language, like all
language, conveys meaning only because a linguistic community attaches common
understandings to words and phrases, and relies on shared conventions for deciphering those
words and phrases in particular contexts”).
125. See Eskridge, supra note 113, at 667 (“By focusing on the plain meaning a statute would
have for the ordinary, reasonable reader, the new textualism has the intuitive appeal of looking
at the most concrete evidence of legislative expectations and at the material most accessible to
the citizenry.”); Molot, supra note 21, at 47 (noting that “[a]s a modern textualist, even Justice
Scalia has rejected the “plain meaning” school’s refusal to consider context”); Samuel C.
Rickless, A Synthetic Approach to Legal Adjudication, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 519, 520–21
(2005) (“For the Old Textualists, the relevant kind of meaning is the ‘plain meaning’ elucidated
in the dictionary (word meaning). For the New Textualists, the relevant kind of meaning is what
any reasonable and competent hearer would understand the word to mean in context (hearer
meaning).”); see also In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.)
(indicating that statutory texts must be understood in light of “their contexts—linguistic,
structural, functional, social, historical”).
126. See Manning, supra note 19, at 690.
This may well distract agencies from using the statement of basis and purpose as a
device for coherent explanation of regulatory meaning. However, it does not
foreclose the potential use of statements of basis and purpose in their intended role as
interpretive aids. In a Skidmore regime, if the Court looked to statements of basis and
purpose for evidence of the linguistic and cultural environment in which a regulation
was adopted, agencies would presumably respond by tailoring such statements to that
application. If so, the resulting explanations of agency regulations would
simultaneously enhance the clarity of agency decisionmaking and the accuracy of
judicial review.
Id. (citations omitted); id. at 688 (noting that regulatory texts “like all language, derive meaning
from a ‘linguistic and cultural’ environment”).
127. Id. at 688 n.359 (“Detailed consideration of the relative legitimacy and utility of
particular approaches to textual construction is for another day.”).
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possess the expertise to be able to explain such texts to more
128
generalist readers like a court.
B. Toward Public Meaning
To evaluate these claims, it is important first to ground a theory
of regulatory interpretation in an antecedent account of the political
129
legitimacy of rulemaking. Without one, it would be difficult even to
determine the relevant objects of interpretation—which texts or
documents should be considered authoritative and why. When
Congress grants rulemaking ability to an agency, it authorizes that
agency to exercise a quasi-lawmaking power with the effect of a
130
statute. With this authority, an agency can promulgate generally
applicable rules with binding, legal consequences—on the public,
131
courts, and the agency itself. Despite constitutional prohibitions on
the congressional delegation of legislative power, however, courts
132
have been loath to police this proscription. As a result, many
administrative innovations can be understood as searches for

128. Id. at 688 (“When confronted with a technical term ‘drawn by specialists,’ an agency’s
‘expertness comes into play’ in explaining specialized terms to a generalist court, whose strong
suit is ordinary meaning.”).
129. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 133 (2011) (“[Lawyers interpreting
statutes] must decide . . . what division of political authority among different branches of
government and civil society is best, all things considered.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism
and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1119, 1119–20 (arguing that notions of “political
obligation” and “political legitimacy” must inform statutory interpretation); Jerry Mashaw, As
If Republican Interpretation, 97 YALE L.J. 1685, 1686 (1988) (“Any theory of statutory
interpretation . . . must . . . assume a set of legitimate institutional roles and legitimate
institutional procedures that inform interpretation.”).
130. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Rules–Interpretative, Legislative, and
Retroactive, 57 YALE L.J. 919, 919 (1948) (defining a “rule” as “the product of rule-making, and
rule-making is the part of the administrative process that resembles a legislature’s enactment of
a statute”).
131. See Ariz. Grocery Co. v. Atchinson, T. & Santa Fe Ry., 284 U.S. 370, 386 (1932)
(“When under this mandate the Commission declares a specific rate to be the reasonable and
lawful rate for the future, it speaks as the legislature, and its pronouncement has the force of a
statute.”).
132. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”);
see Paul Diller, Habeas and (Non-) Delegation, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 585, 588 (2010) (remarking
on “the nondelegation doctrine’s descent into desuetude in the area of administrative law”);
Kagan, supra note 63, at 2364 (observing that it is “commonplace” to note “that the
nondelegation doctrine is no doctrine at all”).
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substitute sources of accountability, often through procedures
134
imposed by Congress and the President.
The most important congressional requirements are those found
in the APA, which generally require agencies to engage in a process
of public notice and comment before promulgating a legislative
135
rule. Specifically, the rulemaking agency must prepare a notice for
the Federal Register, which informs the public of “either the terms or
substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and
136
issues involved.” In practice, most agencies provide both the full
text of the proposed rule as well as an explanatory preamble
137
including various required analyses. A number of cross-cutting
statutes in addition to the APA demand that agencies provide
information about the rule’s anticipated impacts on the environment,
138
states, small businesses, and paperwork obligations.
Presidents have also issued executive orders that require certain
agencies to undertake additional procedures supervised by the
executive branch. Some governing orders, for example, call for
executive agencies to submit to OIRA statements regarding the need
for the regulation and its alignment with presidential priorities, as
well as assessments demonstrating that the benefits of the

133. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Essay, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation
Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1402 (2000) (observing that “[s]ince
the effective demise of the original nondelegation doctrine in 1935, the Court has searched for
ways to assuage its abiding worry about broad delegations”).
134. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 759 (D.D.C. 1971)
(Leventhal, J.) (“The claim of undue delegation of legislative power broadly raises the challenge
of undue power in the Executive and thus naturally involves consideration of the interrelated
questions of the availability of appropriate restraints through provisions for administrative
procedure and judicial review.”); Scott A. Keller, How Courts Can Protect State Autonomy from
Federal Administrative Encroachment, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 45, 59 (2008) (arguing that “given the
underenforcement of the nondelegation doctrine, the Court should apply procedural limits in
the administrative law context ‘as a second-best surrogate’ for the substantive enforcement of
the nondelegation doctrine”).
135. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012).
136. Id.
137. See KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 12, at 64 (stating that “[n]otices of proposed
rulemaking nearly always contain not only the full text of the rule that the agency has developed
to that point but a preamble as well”); id. (“Notices of proposed . . . rules often contain a great
deal of additional information” such as the “results of the reviews they are required to conduct
under a variety of statutes and executive orders.”).
138. See 2 U.S.C. § 1532 (2012) (unfunded mandates on state, local, tribal governments, or
private sector); 5 U.S.C. § 604(b) (2012) (regulatory flexibility analyses); 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)
(2012) (environmental impact statements); 44 U.S.C. § 3507(e) (2012) (paperwork burden
analyses).
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regulation “justify” the costs. Additional executive orders also
demand that agencies gather data on the rule’s expected impacts on
140
141
142
143
states, energy use, small businesses, and Indian tribes, among
other potentially affected groups. In preparing such analyses, agencies
must, in effect, interpret the regulation to predict its consequences:
what is the regulation’s scope and to whom and when does it apply
such that aggregate costs and benefits can be determined? Once the
agency has submitted the draft notice and required analyses to
OIRA, the office will then coordinate a process whereby it will solicit
comments from executive-branch reviewers, and then help to resolve
144
any disagreements that arise.
After this OIRA-coordinated review process is complete, the
agency head must then sign the proposed regulatory text and
145
preamble for publication in the Federal Register. Agencies then
give interested persons an opportunity to comment on the proposed
rule by submitting their views, supporting or opposing arguments, and
146
any relevant evidence. After considering these comments, the
agency can then issue a revised final rule in the Federal Register,
which courts have determined must be a “logical outgrowth” of the

139. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(b), 3 C.F.R. 638, 639 (1994). This executive order, with
minor exceptions, covers all agencies except those “considered to be independent regulatory
agencies,” id. § 1(b)(6), 3 C.F.R. at 641, as defined by a provision of the Paperwork Reduction
Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3502(10) (1988). See also Exec. Order No. 13,563 §§ 1(b), 2–6, 3 C.F.R. 215,
215–17 (2012) (“reaffirm[ing] the principles, structures, and definitions governing contemporary
regulatory review that were established in Executive Order 12866” and modernizing many of its
provisions).
140. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (2000).
141. Exec. Order No. 13,211, 3 C.F.R. 767 (2002).
142. Exec. Order No. 13,272, 3 C.F.R. 247 (2003).
143. Exec. Order No. 13,175, 3 C.F.R. 304 (2001).
144. See Sunstein, supra note 64, at 1844–59 (describing OIRA-coordinated review process).
145. By signing the text of the regulation, the agency head has taken responsibility for the
rule’s authorship. See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001
SUP. CT. REV. 201, 238 (“Authorship is a familiar concept in agency practice; indeed, agencies
today are admirably (if surprisingly) punctilious about this feature of their interpretive rulings
and other actions.”). Depending on how the agency is structured, there is sometimes a
subagency head as well. Prominent examples of this relationship include the Patent and
Trademark Office within the Department of Commerce, or the Food and Drug Administration
within the Department of Health and Human Services. See Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz,
Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 784
n.90, 817–18 (2013).
146. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012) (“After notice required by this section, the agency shall give
interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of
written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation.”).
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147

proposed rule. The APA further requires that the final rule be
accompanied by a “concise and general statement” of the rule’s “basis
148
and purpose.” In practice, however, such statements of basis and
purpose are hardly “concise” given that agencies generally prepare
149
them in anticipation of judicial, executive, and legislative review.
Courts, for their part, now extend a “hard look” to the agency’s
preamble when determining whether a regulation is arbitrary or
150
capricious under the APA. What is important to note about this
standard of rationality is that it is framed exclusively in terms of
151
technocratic factors.
Agencies cannot justify their regulatory
changes by reference to purely political factors, but must be able to
152
explain them with respect to evidence in the rulemaking record.

147. See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 584 F.3d 1076, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(“[O]ur cases finding that a rule was not a logical outgrowth have often involved situations
where the proposed rule gave no indication that the agency was considering a different
approach, and the final rule revealed that the agency had completely changed its position.”);
Nw. Tissue Ctr. v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 522, 528 n.7 (7th Cir. 1993) (“To determine if a final rule is a
logical outgrowth of the proposed one, the court must decide ‘whether the purposes of notice
and comment have been adequately served.’”); see also Phillip M. Kannan, The Logical
Outgrowth Doctrine in Rulemaking, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 213 (1996) (discussing the development
of the logical outgrowth doctrine).
148. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012) (“After consideration of the relevant matter presented, the
agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and
purpose.”).
149. See 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A) (2012) (requiring agencies to “submit to each House of the
Congress and to the Comptroller General a report containing . . . a copy of the rule . . . [and] a
concise general statement relating to the rule, including whether it is a major rule”); Curtis W.
Copeland, The Role of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in Federal Rulemaking,
33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1257, 1273 (2006) (describing the “regulatory review package to OIRA”
as “consisting of the rule, any supporting materials, and a transmittal form”).
150. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012); see Noah, supra note 9, at 309–10, 309 n.203 (observing
that “[a]s courts became more demanding in their substantive review of rules adopted through
notice-and-comment procedures” and adopted a “hard look” approach, “agency prolixity
increased” with “[p]reambles for especially controversial rules . . . [that] respond in detail to
public comments in anticipation of defending against a judicial challenge”); Stack, supra note 9,
at 396 (“Hard-look review imposes a higher standard of rationality as a condition of validity
than the minimum standard applied in constitutional review of legislation.”).
151. See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious
Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 7, 19–20 (2009).
152. Id. at 19–20. This is not, of course, to say that expertise can be hermetically sealed from
politics; to the contrary, different administrations are likely to have different understandings of
the same information and data. See Dan M. Kahan, Ellen Peters, Maggie Wittlin, Paul Slovic,
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Donald Braman & Gregory Mandel, The Polarizing Impact of
Science Literacy and Numeracy on Perceived Climate Change Risks, 2 NATURE CLIMATE
CHANGE 732, 732 (2012); Dan M. Kahan, Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive
Reflection, 8 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 407, 407 (2013). But even when political changes

NOU IN PRINTER-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

114

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

9/15/2015 10:56 PM

[Vol. 65:81

Consequently, agencies attempt to show they have “examine[d] the
relevant data” they received through public comment and then
“articulate a satisfactory explanation for [their] actions,” including
“rational connection[s] between the facts found and the choice[s]
153
made” in their final rules. In other words, agencies usually attempt
to provide a well-reasoned explanation for their policy choices with
reference to the evidence received through notice and comment. In
addition to these explanations, agencies also often publish or
summarize the various final analyses required by statute and
154
executive order in the Federal Register as well. Publication, in turn,
provides formal notice to the public of the rule’s existence and
content; an agency’s failure to publish the regulation would render it
155
ineffective.
Either before or shortly after publication, agencies then send
their final rules to Congress as part of the report-and-wait procedures
156
of the Congressional Review Act (CRA). The CRA demands that
both executive and independent agencies send a copy of every new
“major” final rule to each congressional house as well as the
157
Government Accountability Office. The rules must be accompanied
by their cost-benefit analyses, if any, as well as “any other relevant
158
information or requirements” under statute or executive order. As
such, Congress has available to it the operative regulatory text,
statement of basis and purpose, and any regulatory analyses before
159
deciding whether or not to pass a joint resolution of disapproval.
are the most likely explanation for a policy shift, administrative law only allows such shifts when
accompanied by a reasoned explanation grounded in factual data.
153. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983) (citation omitted).
154. See 44 U.S.C. § 1503 (1982 & Supp. II 1985); Legislation, The Federal Register Act, 49
HARV. L. REV. 1209, 1209 (1936) (“All documents authorized to be published must be filed with
the Division, and they are not valid until so filed and made available for public inspection.”).
155. See 44 U.S.C. § 1507 (1982); Noah, supra note 9, at 285–86 (describing evolving
standards of agency publication in the Federal Register); Randy S. Springer, Note, Gatekeeping
and the Federal Register: An Analysis of the Publication Requirement of Section 552(a)(1)(D) of
the Administrative Procedure Act, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 533, 544 (1989) (“Agency documents that
fall within the provisions of the publication rule of section 552(a)(1)(D) and are not so
published are ineffective against a party without actual notice.”).
156. 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2012).
157. Id. § 801(a)(1)(A)–(B). “Major” rules are defined as those with an annual impact on
the economy of $100 million or more, a “major increase in costs or prices” or other “significant
adverse” effect on the economy. Id. § 804(2).
158. Id. § 801(a)(1)(B).
159. Id. § 801(a)(1)(A)–(B). Beyond replicating bicameralism and presentment, the statute’s
main innovation is that the CRA reduces the costs of nullifying a rule by fast-tracking joint

NOU IN PRINTER-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

REGULATORY TEXTUALISM

9/15/2015 10:56 PM

115

Both the Senate and the House then have sixty days in which to pass
160
such a resolution, which if issued, would then need to be signed by
the President to take effect, or if vetoed, passed by a two-thirds
161
overriding vote. If Congress fails to pass a joint resolution within
162
the required time frame, then the final rule goes into effect.
As this overview of the rulemaking process demonstrates,
administrative agencies have multiple political principals, including
163
Congress and the President. Agencies cannot promulgate binding,
legislative rules without surviving the various procedural chokepoints
164
that can effectively prevent a regulation from going into effect.
These procedures, in turn, help to legitimate the regulations
promulgated by unelected administrators by ensuring review by more
politically accountable actors. Moreover, the information produced as
a result of these procedures—through notice-and-comment, OIRAcoordinated review, as well as congressional oversight—facilitates
165
political monitoring. At each of these junctures, interest groups can
resolutions. These expediting features include the bypass of many potentially obstructive
congressional committees as well as a prohibition on Senate filibusters and fixed time limits on
legislative debates. Id. §802(c)–(f) (discussing the expediting process). The CRA also extends
the time period during which a major rule cannot go into effect, from thirty to sixty days, thus
allowing for longer legislative reconsideration. See Note, The Mysteries of the Congressional
Review Act, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2162, 2166–67 (2009).
160. 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(3).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. Rev.
117, 164–65 (2006) (characterizing agencies as “agents of the executive branch, Congress, or the
people as a whole”); Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 872
(2009) (describing an agency as an “agent . . . formally controlled by other principals, like
Congress, the courts, or the President”).
164. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory
Interpretation, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 677 n.13 (1999) (defining “vetogate” as “a place within a
process where a statutory proposal can be vetoed or effectively killed”). The term “veto gate”
appears to have first appeared in the legal literature in McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra note
13, at 707. Variations of the core idea are also sometimes referred to as “pivot points,” “veto
players,” or the politics of “negative power”—terms which this Article will use interchangeably.
See, e.g., id. at 707 n.5 (defining “veto players”); CAMERON, supra note 14, at 3 (defining the
politics of “negative power” as the “consequences of an institutionalized ability to say no”);
KREHBIEL, supra note 14, at 23–24 (drawing on dictionary definition to specify a “pivot” as “a
person or thing on or around which something turns or depends”).
165. See David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Administrative Procedures, Information, and
Agency Discretion, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 697, 699 (1994) (discussing ongoing oversight of
agencies); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 261–62 (1987)
(describing “tools available to political actors to control administrative outcomes through
process, rather than through substantive guidance in legislation”).
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actively attempt to influence the process by, for example, submitting
comments, scheduling meetings with executive-branch actors, or
lobbying legislators. Such “fire-alarm” oversight, however, is
premised on the public’s understanding of what the text of the
regulation means and how it could affect the various interests
166
implicated.
C. Method
Regulatory textualism thus asks the judge to ascertain the public
meaning of the operative regulatory text in light of a hierarchy of
select sources generated and legitimated by the regulatory procedures
just described. Unlike competing theories, which also invoke the
distinctive nature of the rulemaking process to justify their respective
167
approaches, regulatory textualism emphasizes the importance of a
text’s public meaning as ratified by political principals like the
168
President and Congress, and subject to judicial review.
169
This perspective has statutory and constitutional analogues,
though it is specifically tailored to the procedures through which the

166. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984).
167. See Noah, supra note 9, at 281 (observing that “it is far easier to ascribe an intent to an
agency when it issues a rule than to a legislature when it enacts a statute, both because of
differences in their decisionmaking routines and because of the greater reliability of the
materials that document the bases for their decisions”); Stack, supra note 9, at 380 (noting that
distinctive features of the regulatory process such as “the APA’s procedural requirement that
the agency issue a statement of basis and purpose, the arbitrary and capricious review’s standard
of rationality, and Chenery’s timing rule” justify regulatory purposivism); id. at 392–94 (noting
that “the critical difference between regulations and statute[s] is how the court discerns
purposes”); Weaver, supra note 9, at 711 (“Courts must treat regulations differently than
statutes because agencies generate different types of interpretive materials than do legislatures.
Instead of committee reports, explanations of committee chairmen, records of debate and the
other materials that legislatures typically create, agencies prepare notices of proposed
rulemakings, draft rules, regulatory analyses and other documents.”).
168. Cf. John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 420 (2005)
(noting that the basic premise of textualism is “that judges must seek and abide by the public
meaning of the enacted text, [as] understood in context”); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and
the Unwritten Constitution, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1935, 1956 (characterizing “public-meaning
originalism” as both “go[ing] beyond semantic content; if the meaning of the Constitution were
limited to its semantic content, its meaning would be very sparse—we would read the
Constitution as if we knew nothing about the context in which it was framed and ratified” and
seeking “the linguistic meaning as enriched by the publicly available context of constitutional
communication”).
169. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 168, at 419–50; Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding
Congress: Statutory Interpretation, the Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and the Separation of
Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119, 1166 (2011) (developing an interpretive theory in statutory context
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executive, legislature and the courts imbue regulations with
legitimacy. Specifically, the approach draws upon the nature of these
review processes to generate a hierarchy of sources based on their
public accessibility, reliability, and relevance to the interpretive issue
170
in question. Different forms of regulatory history can be ranked
according to the source’s likelihood to shed credible light on the
public meaning of a text as well as to address the interpretive
question with appropriate specificity.
To aid in this task, positive political theories developed in the
statutory context invite a conception of regulations as bargains struck
between various regulatory actors and interest groups at different
veto-gates of the drafting process—involving the agency head, the
President during OIRA-coordinated review, and legislators pursuant
171
to the CRA. Veto-gates are junctures in an institutional process
during which an authoritative actor can effectively prevent a
172
regulation from proceeding further. The judge’s task is to privilege
sincere rather than strategic statements from these actors as evidence
that “supports a public meaning approach toward statutory interpretation, one which demands
that courts not blind themselves to legislative history as evidence of ordinary or public
meaning”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own
Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 882 (2009) (in constitutional context, equating
“objective, original-public-meaning” with “in-context, written textualism”); Solum, supra note
168, at 1955 (“For public-meaning originalists, the public meaning of the text is produced by the
semantic content of the text as enriched by the publicly available context of constitutional
interpretation.”).
170. Cf. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 20, at 310 (positing that “legislative history should be
used only when it is accessible, relevant, and reliable” and arguing that “there ought to be—and
we think there is—a hierarchy of sources for that history”). Bernard Bell’s statutoryinterpretation theory also calls for the privileging of particular sources of legislative history
based on the extent to which such materials are available to all legislators and considered
authoritative by them, and all legislators are all able to respond. Because the rulemaking
process directly invites the public to participate in its drafting, interpretive materials that are
available to the wider public should similarly be considered as privileged sources in the
regulatory context. See Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History Without Legislative Intent: The
Public Justification Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 83 (1999) (arguing
that the “text of the statute must be interpreted in light of the public justification provided” by
Congress).
171. See STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS 97 (2008) (noting
that “whereas the president lacks the ability to veto selective pieces of legislation, he enjoys a
‘line-item veto,’ so to speak, of agencies’ regulatory initiatives”); Jack M. Beermann,
Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 84 (2006) (“By enacting [the
Congressional Review Act], Congress has taken responsibility for supervising agency
rulemaking and, in a sense, is lending its authority to those rules that it does not overrule under
the procedure.”).
172. Cf. Esksridge, supra note 164, at 677 n.13 (defining “veto gate” as “a place within a
process where a statutory proposal can be vetoed or effectively killed”).
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of the public meaning to which they agreed. Statements are sincere if
173
the speakers would suffer some cost by misrepresenting the bargain.
If a committee report, for instance, misstates the meaning of the bill,
then there is a risk that the median legislator would reject the bill.
Thus, a committee would be better off communicating its true
preferences; as such, the committee report is often a valuable
174
interpretive source in statutory interpretation.
Although these insights are often framed in intentionalist
175
terms, when coupled with a publicity requirement, they can also
help guide the search for regulatory meaning as well—by shedding
light on how the public was most likely to comprehend the meaning
of the text as reflected in the most reliable and accessible statements
by authoritative regulatory actors. Because the rulemaking process,
even more so than the statutory or constitutional contexts, depends
on the ability of the public to directly participate, there is a close
nexus between what the public understands and the materials that are
furnished by regulatory actors for comment. What legitimates the
rulemaking process is not the private preferences of pivotal
regulatory actors, but rather their public rationales, which form the
basis for interest-group participation.
Applying these premises, the interpretive materials that are the
most likely to be credible are those that are made public and subject
to multiple forms of oversight by pivotal actors. Accordingly,
regulatory textualism first calls for the judge to read the regulatory
text in light of the relevant explanatory provision in the regulation’s
statement of basis and purpose, or preamble. Preambles are
structured documents that often address each provision of the
regulatory text; thus, locating the appropriate section is often a
176
straightforward task.
In addition, these explanations usually

173. McNollgast, Legislative Intent, supra note 13, at 26 (“Observing costly actions can help
judges exclude some alternative interpretations.”).
174. Id. at 27–28 (discussing committee report example).
175. See id. at 3 (seeking to “identify aspects of the legislative history that are more reliably
informative about the intent of the majority coalition that enacted a statute” (emphasis added)).
176. See STACK, supra note 12, at 34, 37–38 (observing that although agency practices can
vary, they often “organize background discussions of preambles in a section-by-section
format”); id. at 48 (noting that “a well-organized preamble reduces the costs of locating its
guidance”); Stack, supra note 9, at 404 (observing that “statements of basis and purpose
generally appear in a single, highly organized document”); id. at 406 (noting that “at a practical
level . . . statements of basis and purpose are typically much more specific than statutory
statements of purpose”).
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respond to material public comments in detailed ways, as, for
example, when commenters ask how particular terms are defined and
178
the agency attempts to clarify.
Provision-by-provision analyses in preambles are the most
reliable sources of the text’s public meaning because they are subject
to review by multiple veto-gate actors, including the President,
Congress, and the courts. Consequently, it would be costly for the
agency to attempt to strategically skew the meaning of a text away
from what it publicly conveyed earlier, or to otherwise self-delegate
179
through intentionally vague explanations. Not only could such
efforts result in the rejection or revision of a regulation if the agency
is subject to OIRA-coordinated or congressional review, but the
preamble could also be vulnerable to judicial challenge as arbitrary or
180
capricious, as failing to provide sufficient notice to allow for
181
adequate comment, or as otherwise not constituting a “logical
182
outgrowth” of the final rule.
Moreover, some have aptly observed that these materials are to a
183
final rule much like what ratified legislative history is to a statute.
Indeed, Congress will occasionally formally adopt and approve
selections of its drafting history directly in the enacted statutory text.
177. See STACK, supra note 12, at 37 (“Agencies also provide guidance in the course of
responding to comments through a section-by-section analysis.”).
178. Id. at 36–37 (“Agencies frequently provide guidance about the meaning and application
of their regulations in a dialogue with commenters in the preamble.”); id. at 11 (noting that
preambles include “engagement with commentators”); Noah, supra note 9, at 311 (observing
that “a preamble may have included reassurances in response to comments that expressed
concerns about particular applications of a proposed rule”).
179. Cf. Stack, supra note 9, at 416 (considering administrative law doctrines that would
mitigate the “prospect for strategic manipulation by agencies if courts treated statements of
basis and purpose as privileged interpretive sources” by “making their policy resistant to
change, issue only obscure statements in the hopes of preserving their future flexibility, or
attempt to smuggle policies into statements of basis and purpose”).
180. See supra notes 150–153 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 147 and accompanying text; Stack, supra note 9, at 417 (observing that
“agencies have been tempted to smuggle important policies into their statements of basis and
purpose that were not previously subjected to the notice-and-comment process” but that these
temptations are mitigated by “enforcement of the procedural core of notice-and-comment
rulemaking: that the public has an adequate opportunity to comment on the agency’s proposed
policy”).
182. See Stack, supra note 9, at 418 n.308 (discussing the “logical outgrowth” doctrine).
183. See Noah, supra note 9, at 311–12. To illustrate, he offers the example of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, which states that “[n]o statements other than the interpretive memorandum
appearing at Vol. 137 Congressional Record S 15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) shall be
considered legislative history . . . .” See id. (citing Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(b), 105 Stat. 1071,
1075).
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Such ratified legislative history is distinct from ordinary legislative
history because it has been signed by the President and adopted by
Congress as a whole, rather than one of its committees. Similarly, the
preamble’s provision-by-provision explanations and responses to
comments have also been officially approved and ratified by the
agency as an institution after review by multiple authoritative actors.
But, unlike legislative history, these materials have also undergone
public comment and thus the scrutiny of interested parties.
184
regulatory
By contrast to Stack’s purposivist approach,
textualism rejects reliance on the broad statements of purpose often
found in preambles in favor of the more specific explanatory
provisions. Such broad statements are pitched at too high a level of
185
abstraction to inform the court’s specific interpretive task. These
statements, as discussed, also often admit of multiple purposes or
simply mirror the language of the statute in ways that do not shed any
186
independent interpretive light. At best, they might be understood as
guidance for future agency interpretations, given that agencies are
more institutionally capable of applying purposivist approaches
187
relative to courts.
If the specific preamble provision is silent or otherwise unable to
yield sufficient insights to resolve the ambiguity, then the judge
should next proceed to the regulatory analyses published or
referenced in the Federal Register. These analyses usually apply the
regulation to specific factual scenarios to determine the various
consequences of the regulation. Should the agency strategically
misstate the impacts of the rule, it could face a potential veto by the
executive branch, Congress, or the courts. To predict these
consequences, agency staff must, in effect, interpret the regulation
184. See Stack, supra note 9, at 395 (noting that when a statement of basis and purpose lacks
a “specific justification,” nevertheless “the more general grounding of the regulation in
protecting the integrity of the markets suggests a guidepost for interpretation”).
185. For example, the roadless rule contained the following broad statement of purpose:
This final rule prohibits road construction, reconstruction, and timber harvest in
inventoried roadless areas because they have the greatest likelihood of altering and
fragmenting landscapes, resulting in immediate, long-term loss of roadless area values
and characteristics . . . . Additionally, the size of the existing forest road system and
attendant budget constraints prevent the agency from managing its road system to the
safety and environmental standards to which it was built.
Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. 3244, 3244 (Jan. 12, 2001) (to be
codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 294).
186. See supra note 69.
187. See STACK, supra note 12, at 3; see also VERMEULE, supra note 18, at 209; Herz, supra
note 23, at 92; Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 18, at 928.
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with some degree of specificity in order to collect the requisite data.
For executive branch agencies, the most commonly available analysis
is the regulatory impact analysis of significant rules required by
188
executive order. These analyses contain the agency’s description of
the rule’s anticipated costs and benefits, net benefits, and the
189
potential alternatives considered. As such, the documents often
communicate the various regulatory options considered and rejected
by the agency. Readers of the regulatory text would thus reasonably
understand the accompanying text as not applying to the rejected
190
options. Judicial regulatory interpretation should, in turn, align with
this public understanding.
To illustrate, take a regulation from the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) revising the definition of “retail pet store” to
narrow the class of parties exempt from various licensing,
191
recordkeeping, and maintenance requirements.
The previous
exemption had covered most retail outlets including those that sold
animals over the Internet, or else through mail or telephone sales,
sight unseen. With the rise of such sales, however, came numerous
public complaints about the lack of oversight in the health and
treatment of these animals, especially given the inability of consumers
192
to personally observe them. In response, the USDA sought to
restrict the exemption so that the rule would now cover these entities.
So the USDA changed the text of the exemption to cover only those
“place[s] of business” in which the “seller, buyer, and the animal
available for sale are physically present so that every buyer may
193
personally observe the animal” before sale. In other words, the

188. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(B), 3 C.F.R. 638, 645 (1994).
189. Id. § 3(c)–(d), 3 C.F.R. at 641.
190. See Noah, supra note 9, at 314–15 (“Obviously, if an agency specifically considers and
rejects such alternatives to a regulation that it promulgates, it should not subsequently interpret
the regulation as if it encompassed one or more of those alternatives all along.”). Indeed,
commenters on agency action regularly do rely on such analyses when submitting their
comments. See, e.g., Ronald E. Wyzga & Annette C. Rohr, Electric Power Research Institute
(EPRI), Comment on EPA Proposed Rule on National Ambient Air Quality Standards for
Particulate Matter (Apr. 18, 2006), http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=
EPA-HQ-OAR-2001-0017-1538&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&content
Type=pdf [http://perma.cc/6Z55-BWKD] (commenting on rule in light of regulatory impact
analysis).
191. Animal Welfare; Retail Pet Stores and Licensing Exemptions, 78 Fed. Reg. 57,227
(Sept. 18, 2013) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 1).
192. Id. at 57,227.
193. Id. at 57,249. The full text of the definition reads:
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exemption now only applied to places of business where the buyer
could actually inspect the animals.
The regulatory impact analysis for the rule, in turn, presented the
194
other options that the USDA had considered, but rejected. One of
those options included the possibility of including hybrid
operations—retailers who sold animals both in physical stores as well
as some sight unseen—from the definition of exempt “retail pet
195
stores.” Because hybrid operators still posed heightened risks to
animals given that that some of the purchasers could not personally
inspect the animals, however, the agency explicitly decided not to
196
exempt such operators. The rule’s resulting regulatory analyses, as
required by executive order and by the Regulatory Flexibility Act
(RFA), then applied this definition in calculating the number of
197
entities potentially affected by the rule. Because the public relied
upon the regulatory impact analysis as an indication of the predicted
regulatory consequences, regulatory textualism calls for the text to be
read consistently with the regulatory impact analysis. Accordingly, in
future cases, the regulatory text defining “retail pet stores” should not
be read to include hybrid operators.
As for their reliability and public availability, regulatory analyses
are generally not as accessible as regulatory preambles. Relative to
such preambles, they tend to have less standardized format and
198
content. Although many agencies do make the full results of such

Retail pet store means a place of business or residence at which the seller, buyer, and
the animal available for sale are physically present so that every buyer may personally
observe the animal prior to purchasing and/or taking custody of that animal after
purchase, and where only the following animals are sold or offered for sale, at retail,
for use as pets: Dogs, cats, rabbits, guinea pigs, hamsters, gerbils, rats, mice, gophers,
chinchillas, domestic ferrets, domestic farm animals, birds, and coldblooded species.
Id.
194. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE,
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS AND FINAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ANALYSIS FOR
FINAL RULE REVISION OF THE DEFINITION OF RETAIL PET STORE 51–55 (2013), http://
www.aphis.usda.gov/publications/animal_welfare/2013/APHIS-2011-0003-15371%20RIA.pdf
[http://perma.cc/Q282-CH52].
195. Id. at 52.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 3–9 (estimating number of potentially affected entities).
198. See Robert W. Hahn, How Changes in the Federal Register Can Help Improve
Regulatory Accountability, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 927, 947 (2000) (observing that “Federal Register
notices that present regulatory analysis currently exhibit a great deal of variation in the kind of
information that is presented”).
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199

analyses available in the Federal Register, agencies also vary greatly
with regard to how much of their analyses they publish as opposed to
200
summarize or incorporate by reference. Many agencies simply make
their regulatory analyses available online, even if not published in the
201
Federal Register. For these reasons, regulatory analyses are not as
consistently accessible as statements of basis and purpose in the
Federal Register and thus should reside lower in the interpretive
hierarchy.
At the same time, regardless of their form, agencies are required
by executive order to “[m]ake available to the public the
information” contained in the regulatory impact analyses submitted
202
to OIRA. Many statutes like the RFA also require agencies to
“make copies of the . . . analysis available to members of the public”
203
and, at a minimum, to include a simple “summary” in the Register.
As a result, such analyses still remain valid interpretive sources as
they are usually publicly accessible in some way, and like statements
of basis and purpose, are also subject to review by multiple politically
authoritative actors. Regulatory impact analyses required by
executive order, for example, are considered by multiple entities
within the executive branch, and then submitted to Congress for

199. See KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 12, at 75–86 (observing that agencies “report in
preambles the results of the reviews they are required to conduct under a variety of statutes and
executive orders”); Matthew D. Adler, Welfare Polls: A Synthesis, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1875, 1903
(2006) (observing that “the EPA, having relied on a [contingent valuation] survey in conducting
its cost-benefit analysis of a rule, may then publish this analysis in the Federal Register”).
200. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REGULATORY REFORM: AGENCIES COULD
IMPROVE DEVELOPMENT, DOCUMENTATION, AND CLARITY OF REGULATORY ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 17, GAO-RCED-98-142 (1998) [hereinafter GAO, REGULATORY REFORM],
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/rc98142.pdf [http://perma.cc/58AH-ZL9B] (“Some of the
analyses [in the studied sample] contained executive summaries, while others relied on the
preambles to the proposed and final rules, published in the Federal Register, to summarize their
results.”); Hahn, supra note 198, at 939 (concluding, based on study of economically significant
rules from 1996 through February 10, 1998, that it is “quite likely that the Federal Register
notices are not taking advantage of important information contained in RIAs”).
201. See Robert W. Hahn and Mary Beth Muething, The Grand Experiment in Regulatory
Reporting, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 607, 626 (2003) (discussing the Office of Management and
Budget’s efforts to increase the amount of regulatory analyses made available online).
202. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(a)(3)(E)(i), 3 C.F.R. 638, 645 (1993).
203. 5 U.S.C. § 604(b) (2012) (“The agency shall make copies of the final regulatory
flexibility analysis available to members of the public and shall publish in the Federal Register
such analysis or a summary thereof.”).
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204

review as well. The same is true of studies prepared under statutes
205
such as the RFA and Paperwork Reduction Act.
As Noah points out, the statement of basis and purpose and the
regulatory analyses are thus analogous to the advisory committee
notes for the Federal Rules of Procedure as well as the application
206
notes published alongside the Federal Sentencing Guidelines —both
207
interpretive sources to which courts give “great weight” or treat as
208
Like these materials, regulatory
“authoritative,” respectively.
analyses are often published contemporaneously with the final rules
209
and guidelines after a report-and-wait procedure with Congress.
They are also adopted by the agency before they are sent to
Congress. Consequently, these materials are less susceptible to the
worry that an unelected civil servant could usurp the agency’s quasi210
legislative function.
Given that regulatory analyses must be
approved by an agency head after multiple review processes, it is
more difficult for unaccountable staff members to sneak in sources
211
without authoritative oversight.

204. See supra notes 139–144 & 163–168 and accompanying text; Sunstein, supra note 64, at
1842 (noting that “[e]specially for economically significant rules, the analysis of costs and
benefits receives careful attention” during OIRA-coordinated review, though “most of OIRA’s
day-to-day work is usually” not “spent . . . on costs and benefits”).
205. See id. at 1870–71 (“OIRA spends a great deal of time helping to promote compliance
with various statutory requirements, including those associated with the Regulatory Flexibility
Act . . . and the Paperwork Reduction Act”).
206. See Noah, supra note 9, at 316 (noting that “at least since Congress began reviewing
new agency rules in 1996, preambles and regulatory analyses may have a better pedigree by
virtue of that report-and-wait system and, therefore, deserve closer attention from the courts
than they have received in the past, more akin to the respect given to the advisory committee
notes that accompany the federal rules of procedure”).
207. See Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 316 (1988); Miss. Publ’g Corp. v.
Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (1946); United States v. Navarro, 169 F.3d 228, 237 (5th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Anderson, 942 F.2d 606, 611 (9th Cir. 1991).
208. See Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 127–30 (1996); Williams v. United States,
503 U.S. 193, 201 (1992) (observing that Sentencing Commission policy statements that
interpret guidelines are “authoritative”); United States v. Hill, 645 F.3d 900, 907–08 (7th Cir.
2011); Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1113 (2002).
209. See Noah, supra note 9, at 316 (“Like the federal rules of procedure, sentencing
guidelines do not take effect until after surviving a report-and-wait process.”).
210. See Manning, supra note 19, at 732.
211. See Noah, supra note 9, at 323 (noting that regulatory history generally “pose[s] less of
a risk of manipulation or circumvention of procedures for legislating than do legislative
histories”); Stack, supra note 9, at 416–18 (analyzing various “incentives for strategic
manipulation” by agency actors).
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Another useful parallel here is that between regulatory analyses
and cost estimates provided by the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) with respect to legislation. By statute, the CBO provides
Congress with estimated budgetary impacts of bills approved by
212
certain congressional committees. Because Congress often “drafts in
the shadow” of these CBO budget scores, Professors Abbe Gluck and
Lisa Bressman have proposed an “interpretive presumption” that
statutory ambiguities be construed consistently with these scores
213
given their “centrality” to the drafting process. Whatever the
strength of their argument in the context of statutory interpretation,
the case for consulting relevant analogues in regulatory interpretation
is even stronger. Although the CBO produces cost estimates for
almost every bill approved by a full congressional committee, such
214
estimates are not formally subject to public notice and comment. By
contrast, the regulatory analyses that accompany a proposed rule are
generally vetted and supplemented by interest groups and other
rulemaking participants, thus rendering the public understanding of
such analyses that much more integral to the regulatory drafting
process. In addition, such analyses form the basis for what can
amount to a veto by the President and Congress before the regulation
can be promulgated; such analyses can also be subject to judicial
arbitrary-and-capricious review in a way that CBO budget scores are
215
not.

212. Section 402 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 directs
the CBO to estimate the budgetary effects of bills and resolutions approved by various
congressional committees. Congressional Budget and Improvement Control Act of 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-344, §§ 201–203, 88 Stat. 297, 302–05 (2012) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 601–
603 (2012)).
213. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Insidean Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L.
REV. 725, 763–65 (2014); Abbe Gluck, The “CBO Canon” and the Debate Over Tax Credits on
Federally Operated Health Insurance Exchanges, BALKINIZATION (July 10, 2012, 8:55 PM),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/07/cbo-canon-and-debate-over-tax-credits.html [http://perma.cc/
6FD5-LPBA].
214. See Processes: What Methodology Does CBO Use in its Analyses?, CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, http://www.cbo.gov/about/our-processes [http://perma.cc/7A8L-7BBE]
(describing informational sources for cost estimates, which include “the government’s statistical
agencies . . . data and information from numerous outside experts” as well as informal and
formal consultations).
215. See Thomas O. McGarity, Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory Reform, 65 TEX. L. REV.
1243, 1323 (1987) (“Because substantive judicial review focuses upon whether the agency
exercised reasoned decision making, given the evidence in the rule-making record, a wellcrafted regulatory analysis in the rule-making record may persuade a reviewing court that the
agency did reach its decision rationally.”).
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In short, regulatory textualism calls for the judge to discern the
semantic meaning of the regulatory text by reference to, first, the
preamble’s provision-by-provision analysis, and then the regulatory
analyses. Both of these sources are sufficiently accessible and reliable
to serve as valid bases of textual interpretation. As later discussed, if
none of these materials in the preamble resolve the ambiguity, then
the court should defer to an agency’s interpretation as long as it
provides a sufficiently reasoned explanation.
Structuring the interpretive inquiry accordingly will likely appeal
to textualists who generally prefer a more rule-like interpretive
216
approach to minimize judicial discretion, one that favors formalism
217
over functionalism. Many state courts, for example, employ a tiered
methodology for statutory interpretation that Professor Gluck refers
to as “modified textualism,” which privileges the text first and
foremost; if the statutory text alone cannot resolve the ambiguity,
then the judge is allowed to consider the legislative history, followed
218
by judicial presumptions such as substantive canons.
Gluck
hypothesizes that this structured, textualist approach helps to serve as
a coordinating device between litigants and various courts in addition
to fostering potential methodological consensus between avowed
219
textualists and nontextualists.
Similarly, explicit hierarchical approaches like regulatory
textualism can also have a restraining effect that helps to promote
220
traditional rule-of-law values such as judicial fidelity. Because
judges can only consult a limited number of interpretive materials

216. See Nelson, supra note 21, at 351 (arguing that the “rules and standards . . . distinction
is a surer guide to the systematic differences between textualist and intentionalism than more
highfalutin talk about the fundamental goals of interpretation or the distinction between
‘objective’ meaning and ‘subjective’ intent”).
217. See VERMEULE, supra note 18, at 72 (describing one version of formalism in which
“courts make a second-order decision to decide cases, where possible, according to rules rather
than standards, sticking close to the apparent or surface meeting of legal texts and placing great
emphasis upon the value of legal certainty and the value of adhering to common understandings
of constitutional and statutory commands”); Daniel A. Farber, Do Theories of Statutory
Interpretation Matter? A Case Study, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1409, 1411–16 (distinguishing
“textualism” or “formalism” from “dynamic interpretation” or “pragmatism”); Gluck, supra
note 22, at 1834 (characterizing as at the “heart” of textualism a “predictable, formalized
approach that can clarify the interpretive process”).
218. See Gluck, supra note 22, at 1758, 1829 (“[T]he drive to interpretive consensus in each
of the states studied centers around a ‘modified textualist’ approach that state courts expressly
derive from Justice Scalia’s textualism, but which is not identical to it.”).
219. Id. at 1856–57.
220. Id. at 1820–21.
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with the same relative priority, it is more difficult for them to scour
221
the regulatory history in search of sympathetic sources. For a
textualist, the ideal type of regulatory history is “an objective,
unmanufactured history of a [regulation’s] context” that sheds light
222
on whether a regulation, say, “codifies an established term of art.”
The regulatory preamble and analyses are sources that come closest
to fulfilling this ideal.
D. Applications
To illustrate regulatory textualism in practice, this Section now
considers more concrete examples applying the method.
1. The Forest Service Roadless Rule. The Forest Service, a
subagency within the USDA, passed a legislative rule prohibiting the
building of any new “road” in inventoried areas of designated
223
national forests. The Forest Service interpreted the rule to permit a
company to build a thirty-year right-of-way for motorized vehicles
involved in the construction of a pipeline. Specifically, the permit
allowed for a ten-mile, fifty-foot right-of-way alongside the proposed
pipeline intended for a “variety of motor vehicles” such as “pickup
224
trucks, bulldozers, backhoes, and other heavy machinery.” The
right-of-way would result in the necessary destruction of trees to
allow for these vehicles to bring equipment and supplies to build the
pipeline and, once built, to then allow such vehicles to use the right225
of-way on a case-by-case basis for emergency repairs to the pipeline.
In the agency’s view, the right-of-way did not constitute a prohibited
“road” under the regulation.
Environmental groups, however, challenged the issuance of the
permit as a violation of the legislative rule. In their view, a “road”
constituted any area over which a motor vehicle could traverse from
point to point. Thus, the Forest Service violated its own rule by
221. See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (invoking
Judge Harold Leventhal’s metaphor describing “the use of legislative history as the equivalent
of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one’s
friends”).
222. John Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 731
(1997).
223. This example is drawn largely from Wilderness Workshop v. U.S. Bureau of Land
Management, 531 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2008), with some simplifications.
224. Appellants’ Supplemental Brief at 11, Wilderness Workshop, 531 F.3d 1220 (No. 081165) (citing the record).
225. Wilderness Workshop, 531 F.3d at 1222–26.
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permitting the building of a right-of-way to facilitate motor-vehicle
movement for pipeline development.
Regulatory textualism would first focus the judge’s attention on
the operative text of the regulation which provides the following
definition of a “road”:
Road. A motor vehicle travelway over 50 inches wide, unless
designated and managed as a trail. A road may be classified,
226
unclassified, or temporary.

A prohibited “temporary” road, in turn, is defined as a “road
authorized by contract, permit, lease, other written authorization, or
emergency operation, not intended to be part of the forest
transportation system and not necessary for long-term resource
227
management.” Thus, in this case, the fact that the Forest Service’s
permit was temporary, lasting only for thirty years, would not resolve
the interpretive ambiguity.
The next immediate semantic question that arises would be
whether the fifty-foot pipeline right-of-way is a “travelway” or else an
excluded “trail.” Neither term is explicitly defined in the operative
228
regulatory text. So the textualist judge would then move on to the
provision-by-provision explanation in the regulatory preamble.
There, the judge would see that in the subsection discussing the
definition of a “road,” the agency directly acknowledged
commenters’ concerns that the definition could be ambiguous. In
response, the Forest Service noted that “[f]or agency consistency, this
final rule includes the same definitions of ‘road,’ . . . and ‘temporary
road’ that are contained in the National Forest System Road
229
Management regulations.” In other words, the definition of “road”
in the roadless rule was clarified to match the Forest Service’s already
existing road-management regulations.
From this observation, it would be reasonable for the judge to
then attempt to read the definition in pari materia with the existing
regulations, that is, consistently and with reference to the agency’s

226. Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. 3244, 3272 (Jan. 12, 2001) (to
be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 294).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 3267.
229. Id. at 3251; see also Administration of the Forest Development Transportation System;
Prohibitions; Use of Motor Vehicles Off Forest Service Roads, 66 Fed. Reg. 3206, 3217 (Jan. 12,
2001) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 212).
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230

other regulations. If the Forest Service had interpreted its previous
regulatory definition of a road, for example, not to apply to rights-ofway for construction-related motor vehicles, then, perhaps the court
could interpret the definition accordingly. Unfortunately, however,
the opinions in the case are unclear as to how the Forest Service had
interpreted its other regulations in the past, leaving the matter still
unresolved.
Pressing on with the agency’s explanation of how “road” was
defined, the judge would then see that the agency had further
clarified the definition of a “trail” in the regulatory preamble: “A trail
is established for travel by foot, stock, or trail vehicle, and can be
231
over, or under, 50 inches wide.” According to the record, the permit
was not granted for a right-of-way that would be created by foot or
232
stock, such as by horse or cattle. Would the right-of-way be
established by a “trail vehicle”? Although the meaning of “trail
vehicle” is not self-evident, the record in the case suggested that the
right-of-way would be cleared by a bulldozer, which is unlikely to fall
233
into the ordinary definition of a “trail vehicle.” From this language,
the judge would likely be able to conclude that the right-of-way for
construction vehicles did not fall into the “trail” exception.
To the extent that “trail” and “travelway” nevertheless remain
ambiguous, the judge should then look at the regulatory analyses that
were prepared for the rule to see what light they could shed on the
234
meaning of “travelway” in particular. In the regulatory impact
analysis, for example, the judge would see that an explicit cost of the
rule was identified as “special-use authorizations (such as
235
communications sites, electric transmission lines, pipelines).” The
costs associated with this consequence were then qualitatively

230. Statutes can be read in pari materia, by reference to related statutes, when the statutes
“pertain to the same subject matter—when they relate to the same person or thing, to the same
class of persons of things, or have the same purpose or object.” 2B NORMAN J. SINGER,
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51:3 (7th ed. 2007).
231. Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. at 3272.
232. See Appellants’ Supplemental Brief at 11, Wilderness Workshop v. U.S. Bureau of
Land Mgmt., 531 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2008) (No. 08-1165) (citing the record’s indication that the
right-of-way would be “cleared” and “graded to provide for safe and efficient operation of
construction equipment and inspection vehicles”).
233. Id. at 2 (citing the record indicating the right-of-way would be “bulldoz[ed]”).
234. Indeed, the roadless rule was anticipated to have an annual impact of more than one
hundred million dollars and was thus deemed economically significant and submitted to OIRA.
Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. at 3267.
235. Id. at 3269 (emphasis added).
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estimated: “Current use and occupancies not affected, future
developments requiring roads excluded in inventoried roadless areas
236
unless one of the exceptions applies.” As none of the exceptions
applied, the analysis accordingly contemplated that the final rule
237
would impose costs on the future development of pipelines. Other
stated costs of the rule included various activities that would be
238
limited because “roads are often needed for these activities.” These
activities included gas development and “energy-related transmission
239
uses (such as ditches and pipelines . . . ).”
The environmental impact assessment identified similar
consequences of the rule:
An additional optional exception was considered in detail . . . as a
social and economic mitigation measure and was available for
selection with any alternative. This exception would have allowed
road construction or reconstruction where a road is needed for
prospective mineral leasing activities in inventoried roadless
areas . . . .
The Department has decided not to adopt the exception for
future discretionary mineral leasing . . . because of the potentially
significant environmental impacts that road construction could cause
to inventoried roadless areas. Existing leases are not subject to the
240
prohibitions.

In other words, the final environmental impact assessment specifically
considered the rule’s prohibitive effects on new mineral leases.
Regulatory textualism would prohibit the judge from interpreting
“road” to allow a right-of-way specifically for oil- and gas-pipeline
construction vehicles. In particular, the interpretation is difficult to
reconcile with the rejected regulatory alternatives that the agency had
considered, including options to exempt the kinds of rights-of-way

236. Id.
237. The rule’s only explicitly carved-out exceptions included situations that posed an
imminent threat to public health and safety; those when it would be necessary to engage in
environmental cleanup activities such as the cleanup of toxic chemicals from an abandoned
mine; those in which a preexisting right was reserved by statute, treaty, or other legal
entitlement; and those when it would be necessary to correct irreparable resource damage. Id. at
3255. Finally, the rule allowed for road construction to implement a road-safety-improvement
project if necessary to respect existing mineral leases and it also allowed for “infrequent” timber
harvesting of small-diameter trees. Id. at 3258.
238. Id. at 3268.
239. Id. (emphasis added).
240. Id. at 3256.
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that would likely be necessary for new pipeline and other mineralrelated developments. Thus, the reasonable reader would likely have
understood “road” to prohibit the kind of pipeline-related rights-ofway contemplated in the case.
Now contrast the regulatory textualist method with how the
Tenth Circuit actually approached the question. The court first
looked at dictionaries and concluded that the term “travelway” was
241
ambiguous. While citing the resulting need for deference to the
242
current agency’s interpretation, the panel then took pains to
determine whether that interpretation was “consistent” with the
243
regulation. Instead of first considering other aspects of the codified
regulatory text or the agency’s direct explanation for the term,
however, the court instead looked to whether the agency’s
interpretation aligned with “two provisions of the roadless rule’s
244
preamble”—select excerpts of the court’s choosing. The first
provision explicitly distinguished between wilderness areas and
protected inventoried areas, and stated that the latter could be used
for a “multitude of activities including motorized uses, grazing, and
245
oil and gas development.” The second excerpt indicated that the
rule was adopted in part due to “budget constraints” that made it
impossible for the Forest Service to manage “the existing forest road
system . . . to the safety and environmental standards to which it was
246
built.” Both of these statements appeared in the agency’s abstract
247
and untethered discussions of the rule’s purpose.
From these materials, the majority concluded that the preamble
“clearly” favored the Forest Service’s interpretation because it indeed

241. Wilderness Workshop v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 531 F.3d 1220, 1226–27 (10th Cir.
2008) (“The key term in this definition, ‘travelway,’ is not defined in the Roadless Rule, nor
does it appear to have any commonly accepted meaning, since it is not found in any
contemporary dictionaries that we are aware of.”).
242. Id. at 1227 (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 463 (1997); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v.
Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994)).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. (quoting Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. at 3249).
246. Id. (quoting Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. at 3244).
247. Specifically, the first declaration appeared in the agency’s provision-by-provision
explanation of the codified purpose of the rule, in response to commenters who questioned
whether the rule allowed for multiple uses of the inventoried roadless areas. Special Areas;
Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. at 3249. The second appeared in the preamble’s
broad discussion of the “[p]urpose and [n]eed” of the regulation. Id. at 3244.
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aligned with the “purpose” of the rule. Specifically, the rights-ofway were simply “construction zones” and “nothing in the record”
suggested they would be “considered part of the forest road
249
system.” Moreover, the court also surmised that authorizing such
construction zones would not burden the Forest Service’s road250
maintenance budget. In other words, the judges reasoned that
because the purpose of the rule was to entertain uses like oil and gas
development, the pipeline right-of-way aligned with one of the Forest
Service’s goals. At the same time, the right-of-way could simply be
characterized as a construction area rather than a “road” to facilitate
motor-vehicle movement. As a result, the panel concluded that
“travelway” need not be interpreted to include the right-of-way at
251
issue—leading to the Forest Service’s victory.
The court’s approach illustrates just some of the potential
problems with intentionalist and purposivist methods of
interpretation. By picking and choosing selectively from the
preamble’s broad statements of purpose instead of prioritizing only
the specific, explanatory provision and the regulatory analyses, the
panel was able to reach a policy conclusion contradicted by more
specific and salient sources. Even at the level of broad generalities,
the panel failed to acknowledge other language stating that the rule
“prohibits road construction . . . in inventoried roadless areas because
they have the greatest likelihood of altering and fragmenting
252
landscapes.” In other words, the rule specified multiple policy goals
of the regulation, such as environmental protection in addition to oil
and gas development. Moreover, the judges engaged in analyses for
which they were institutionally incompetent, including speculation
about the determinants of the agency’s budget.
Furthermore, even while invoking the rule’s purpose, the
majority failed to prioritize or even mention the agency’s codified
statement of purpose in the regulatory text, relying instead on the
253
preamble’s broad and uncodified statements of purpose. That text
was much clearer that the rule was written to balance multiple policy
goals and not only oil and gas development. Specifically, the codified

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Wilderness Workshop, 531 F.3d at 1227 n.5.
Id. at 1227.
Id.
Id. at 1227–28.
Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. at 3244.
Wilderness Workshop, 531 F.3d at 1227.
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regulatory text declared that “[t]he purpose of this subpart is to
provide, within the context of multiple-use management, lasting
protection for inventoried roadless areas within the National Forest
254
System.” In fact, the Forest Service explicitly explained in its
provision-by-provision analysis that it had revised that text to clarify
that environmental protection had to be balanced against other
255
potential uses for the inventoried roadless areas. Had the court
focused on the codified regulatory text first, it would have had to
engage in a more focused inquiry to demonstrate the consistency of
the agency’s interpretation with the text of the rule itself.
2. The FCC Minority-Control Broadcasting Rule. Now consider
another example, this time from an independent agency with a
multimember commission not subject to OIRA-coordinated
256
presidential review: the FCC. In 1985, the FCC issued a final rule
that limited commercial television broadcasters to twelve licenses
with an explicit exception permitting two additional licenses for
257
“minority-controlled” stations. The regulatory text stated that
“‘minority-controlled’ means more than 50 percent owned by one or
258
more members of a minority group.” About fourteen years after the
initial regulation was issued, the FCC interpreted this regulatory text
as requiring an applicant to show a numerical majority–minority
interest as well as to demonstrate the actual control of such

254. Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. at 3272.
255. Indeed, in response to public comments, the Forest Service decided to change the final
codified purpose to “emphasize that the goal of providing lasting protection of roadless areas
must occur within the context of multiple-use management.” Id. at 3250.
256. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 18 (2010) (“Removal protection for agency heads is the touchstone
[for identifying independent agencies], but independent agencies are also typically characterized
by their multimember structure and the fact that, unlike executive agencies, they do not have to
submit cost-benefit analyses of proposed rules for review by the President’s Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs.”); Datla & Revesz, supra note 145, at 772 (observing that
although “[i]ndependent agencies are almost always defined as agencies with a for-cause
removal provision,” there are actually multiple “indicia of independence: removal protection,
specified tenure, multi-member structure, partisan balance requirements, litigation authority,
budget and congressional communication authority, and adjudication authority”). The
Paperwork Reduction Act also includes the Federal Communications Commission among its
statutory definition of “independent regulatory agencies.” 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2000).
257. Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 50 Fed. Reg. 4666
(Feb. 1, 1985) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73).
258. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d)(3)(iii) (1990).
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minorities. Pursuant to this interpretation, the Commission denied
an application to renew a commercial television-broadcast license as a
260
sanction for the applicant’s earlier claim to a minority preference.
That earlier claim was based only on a numerical majority-minority
board without a showing of de facto minority control (for example, in
261
terms of the day-to-day management operations). The applicant
filed suit, arguing that the FCC’s interpretation was invalid because
the text defined “minority control” only as “more than 50 percent
262
owned by one or more members of a minority group.”
Regulatory textualism privileges the agency’s operative
regulatory text. Here, the text clearly stated that the regulation’s
definition of “minority-control” was a numerical one. The provisionby-provision justification in the preamble confirmed this
interpretation. There, the reader would have seen the agency’s
further explanation:
A question arises as to the proper definition of a minority owned
station for the purposes of our multiple ownership rules. In this
regard, we note that the Commission has adopted different
standards of minority control depending on the mechanism used to
foster its minority policies. In the context of the multiple ownership
policies, we believe that a greater than 50 percent minority
ownership interest is an appropriate and meaningful standard for
263
permitting increases to the rules adopted herein.

In this manner, the enacting FCC explicitly sought to clarify any
ambiguity in the regulatory text introduced by the agency’s previous
“different standards of minority control”—which had sometimes
264
recognized an actual-control test —in favor of a bright-line
numerical rule. Put differently, the final rule made clear that the
FCC’s previous policies had sometimes defined minority control as
259. See Trinity Broad. of Fla., Inc. v. FCC, 211 F.3d 618, 625 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“For these
reasons, we agree . . . that majority-minority boards of directors of non-profit entities must
exercise de facto control.”).
260. See id. at 624.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 625 (quoting 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d)(3)(iii)).
263. In re Amendment of Section 73.3555 [formerly Sections 73.35, 73.240 and 73.636] of the
Comm’ns Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broad. Stations,
100 F.C.C.2d 74, 95 (1985) [hereinafter Amendment of Section 73.3555] (citation omitted).
264. For example, the rule cited an FCC policy document to illustrate its previous “different
standards of minority control.” That document provided that preferential treatment for a tax
certificate would be granted “where minority ownership is in excess of 50% or controlling.”
Trinity Broad. of Fla., 211 F.3d at 626 (emphasis added) (quoting 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d)(3)(iii)).
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part of a functional test regarding evidence of actual control, and it
265
explicitly rejected that definition in the rule’s preamble. For these
reasons, a court employing regulatory textualism would have rejected
the FCC’s interpretation in the case.
Despite the regulatory text, the D.C. Circuit took a decidedly
purposivist approach and found that the FCC’s interpretation was not
266
“inconsistent” with the underlying purpose of the regulation. In the
majority’s view, it was “hard to imagine . . . how an entity controlled
by minorities in name only or in which the minorities’ interests are
totally passive could foster the objective of the Commission’s policies
to broaden minority voices and spheres of influence over the
267
airwaves.” In other words, the panel found that the broadcasting
rule’s policy goal was to increase minority influence in commercial
broadcasting. Accordingly, in the court’s view, only a de facto control
test could properly further the FCC’s objective and was therefore an
appropriate interpretation of the regulation. Whether true as an
empirical matter or not, the court’s conclusion was a policy judgment
rendered without access to the relevant data or expertise.
Oddly, the D.C. Circuit then determined that the FCC’s
interpretation nevertheless failed to provide fair notice to the
applicants precisely because the relevant text and other agency
statements failed to inform the public that a control test would be
applied. The panel therefore vacated the denial of the agency’s
268
license application. In other words, it concluded that the regulation
could be interpreted to require minority control, but that such an
interpretation violated basic due process. Indeed, these concerns go
to the heart of the problems with intentionalist and purposivist
approaches. In effect, then, the D.C. Circuit interpreted the definition
of “minority-control” to require de facto control, but then applied
265. This textual interpretation is further bolstered by a dissent to the rule filed by a
commissioner. Although not dispositive, that dissent interpreted the regulation as not requiring
de facto minority control:
Under the majority’s scheme, the right to purchase broadcast stations over the
established ceiling turns upon the race of the proposed owners alone. No further
showing is required with respect to how these new owners may contribute to
diversity. No concern is given as to whether the 51% minority owners will exert any
influence on the station’s programming or will have any control at all.
Amendment of Section 73.3555, 100 F.C.C.2d at 104 (Comm’r Patrick, dissenting in part).
266. Trinity Broad. of Fla., 211 F.3d at 625 (“The question [in this case], then, is this: Does
the Commission’s interpretation ‘sensibly conform’ to both the purpose and the text of the
regulation?”).
267. Id. (emphasis added).
268. Id. at 619.
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this flawed interpretation prospectively. In doing so, however, the
court allowed the creation of a new legal obligation without the
requisite notice and comment. By permitting the FCC’s interpretation
to stand, the court essentially facilitated an amendment to the rule
without the required rulemaking process.
E. Alternatives and Objections
Despite regulatory textualism’s concern with semantic meaning,
its constraint on interpretive sources, and relatively rule-like
approach, one might nevertheless remain unconvinced that the
approach is sufficiently textualist. Isn’t it really a form of weak
intentionalism or purposivism? Ultimately, the charge boils down to
one of definition. Nevertheless, if one wants to recharacterize
regulatory textualism as something else, the substance of the theory
remains. Thus, it will now be fruitful to put the labels temporarily
aside to more sharply highlight the differences with competing
approaches.
The theory that would be the most useful to compare would be
Professor Kevin Stack’s approach, as it shares some superficial
similarities; namely, they both restrict the judge’s interpretive
269
sources, albeit in different ways and for different reasons. Stack’s
purposivist method, recall, asks the interpreter to consult the rule’s
statement of basis and purpose as if it were part of the enacted
regulatory text. In doing so, Stack argues, the judge should attempt to
understand the enacting agency’s objectives when promulgating the
regulation and to interpret the regulation consistently with those
270
objectives.
Stack’s regulatory purposivism, however, largely
conceives of rulemaking procedures focused on the requirements of
the APA as well as federal common law requirements such as hard

269. By contrast, Noah’s intentionalist approach relies on a hierarchy of regulatory history
that takes into account materials produced as a result of presidential and legislative oversight,
but does not offer any explicit ranking criteria; as a result, he allows for the consideration of
some materials such as agency-official depositions, which are generally unreliable. See Noah,
supra note 9, at 314 (observing as possible sources of interpretation the materials resulting from
the fact that “Congress has added a series of analytical demands that agencies consider the
possible consequences of their actions on such things as the environment, small businesses, and
paperwork burdens; in addition, executive orders over the years have called on agencies to pay
special attention to possible impacts on inflation, business, and federalism”); see also id. at 320
(“Regulated parties may attempt to depose agency officials who were responsible for drafting
the regulation or else seek discovery of documents reflecting internal deliberations.”).
270. See Stack, supra note 9, at 398.
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look review and Chenery’s demand that the agency rely on its
272
original rationale. Because he views these elements as central to the
rulemaking process, Stack argues that the regulatory text and APArequired statement of basis and purpose are the most relevant sources
of interpretation. Though Stack does acknowledge the role of
273
presidential review in helping to rationalize regulations, the public
materials prepared by agencies as part of this legitimating process are
not valid sources in his approach.
By comparison, regulatory textualism draws much of its
normative force from the political authority of regulations and the
veto-gate procedures that elected officials have imposed to monitor
them. The interpretive method accordingly takes structural cues from
the rulemaking process beyond judicial review to shed light on what
the public would have understood as the meaning of the regulations
accepted by Congress and the President. Put differently, the approach
searches for the meaning of the regulatory text as informed by the
publicly available materials that elected actors have furnished as the
bases for their ratification of the regulation.
As such, regulatory textualism seeks to build upon Stack’s and
other scholars’ insights regarding the utility of the regulatory
preamble as an interpretive source, but attempts to do so with some
distinct premises regarding the nature of the rulemaking process.
Instead of focusing on the judicial elaboration of the APA, regulatory
textualism emphasizes the role of the President and Congress in
negotiating regulatory texts within the permissible range of discretion
left open by arbitrary-and-capricious review. As a result, the
approach identifies other interpretive sources such as the regulatory
analyses required by executive order and statute as appropriate
evidence of the text’s public meaning.
In addition, regulatory textualism also resists Stack’s invitation to
treat the statement of basis and purpose as analogous to an enacted
statutory statement of purpose and thus a coequal part of the

271. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
272. Id. at 87–88; Stack, supra note 9, at 380; see also Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing
Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1298 (2012) (giving as an example
of administrative common law “the reasoned decisionmaking requirement” required by hard
look review); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408,
473 n.34 (2007) (characterizing Chenery as “requiring, as a matter of administrative common
law, that an agency action can only be upheld by a reviewing court on the same grounds that the
record discloses the agency’s action was originally based”).
273. Stack, supra note 9, at 397.
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regulatory text itself. For regulatory textualists, the codified
274
regulatory text is the only relevant object of interpretation. The
regulatory text alone is published in the Code of Federal Regulations,
an important legal touchstone for determining whether an agency has
275
issued a substantive, legislative rule. Moreover, as discussed, Stack’s
conception fails to take into account codified statements of purpose
that agencies regularly include in the text itself.
Nevertheless, many purposivists and intentionalists would likely
respond that they too believe in the primacy of the text, and that any
conflict between the text and extratextual sources should be resolved
276
in favor of the former. Although textualists and nontextualists are
indeed likely to agree in the easy cases—when there are clear
conflicts between the text and external sources—many litigated
situations will involve alleged ambiguities that could be resolved in
different ways. These hard cases, such as those involving the Forest

274. One self-professed regulatory textualist is Justice Scalia, who confines his method to
the meaning of the codified regulatory text as well as textual canons of construction. In
interpreting the regulation at issue in Decker, for example, he sought to “us[e] the familiar tools
of textual interpretation to decide: Is what the petitioners did here proscribed by the fairest
reading of the regulations?” Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1342 (2013) (Scalia,
J., dissenting). In parsing the meaning of the EPA regulation at issue, Justice Scalia applied the
textual canon known as the rule of the last antecedent, whereby the “limiting clause or
phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately
follows.” Id. at 1343 (citing Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003)). In addition, Justice
Scalia also considered the ambiguous regulatory provision at issue alongside other provisions in
the codified regulatory text to determine the text’s best reading. Id. at 1344.
275. See, e.g., Am. Min. Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (considering publication of a rule in the Code of Federal Regulations as a factor for
giving the regulation legal effect); Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533, 539
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (observing that “the real dividing point between regulations and general
statements of policy is publication in the Code of Federal Regulations, which . . . statut[ory]
[law] authorizes to contain only documents ‘having general applicability and legal effect,’ and
which the governing regulations provide shall contain only ‘each Federal regulation of general
applicability and current or future effect’”); see also Preamble, THE REGULATORY GRP.,
http://www.regulationwriters.com/regulatory_glossary?id=41 [http://perma.cc/ER23-5MKT] (“A
preamble is not a part of the regulatory text, and therefore does not appear in the Code of
Federal Regulations. A preamble is not legally enforceable . . . .”).
276. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 27, at 542–44 (“The essential rule, perhaps, is not to
violate plain words.”); Noah, supra note 9, at 290 (arguing that, before granting deference,
courts should “pay[] closer attention to the text of an existing rule”); Stack, supra note 9, at 391–
92 (arguing for an interpretive method that would “track those of a purposive approach to
statutes: the court’s aim is to discern the purpose of the regulation and its provisions, and to
interpret the regulation to carry out those purposes to the extent permitted by its text while
remaining consistent with policies and principles of clear statement”); Weaver, supra note 9, at
698–99 (“Courts do not, and should not, relentlessly attempt to effectuate the purpose of an
enactment. Rather, they must be sensitive to its words.”).
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Service’s roadless rule or the FCC’s minority-control regulation, are
the ones that will expose the consequences of various interpretive
commitments. What is really at stake between textualism and its
alternatives is how judges identify and resolve ambiguities, what
questions they ask when attempting to do so, and with what
objectives in mind.
In addition to these contested dimensions, intentionalists and
purposivists are likely to raise a number of other objections to
regulatory textualism as well. One of the strongest may be to the use
of regulatory analyses as interpretive sources because the
consideration of such analyses would raise judicial decision costs.
Because such analyses can be lengthy, asking judges to pore over
these studies would stretch judicial resources too thinly. Note,
however, that many agencies often reference the same regulatory
analyses to fulfill multiple statutory and presidential mandates.
Consider, for example, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
(UMRA), which requires agencies to provide economic assessments
of government mandates affecting state governments, local
277
governments, and the private sector. According to one former
OIRA Administrator, “[a]gencies generally meet UMRA
requirements with reference to regulatory impact analyses prepared
278
pursuant to [e]xecutive [o]rder . . . but rarely do more.” In other
words, agencies often prepare regulatory analyses to submit to
OIRA, and then refer to the same analyses to fulfill multiple
analytical requirements imposed by statute or executive order. As
another example, the Securities and Exchange Commission often
prepares cost-benefit analyses that simply cross-reference their
279
statutorily required estimates of paperwork burdens. Consequently,
the number of independent analyses that actually accompany a final
rulemaking in the Federal Register is usually fairly limited.

277. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (codified in
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
278. See Susan E. Dudley, Prospects for Regulatory Reform in 2011, 12 ENGAGE: J.
FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 7–8 (2011); see also GAO, REGULATORY REFORM, supra
note 200, at 17 n.8 (“Because agencies rarely prepare separate analyses when UMRA is
applicable . . . our findings reflect the extent to which the nine analyses called for under UMRA
satisfy the act’s as well as the executive order’s requirements for economic analyses.”).
279. See Bruce Kraus & Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries for SEC Cost-Benefit Analysis,
30 YALE J. ON REG. 289, 297 (2013) (“SEC CBA did not quantify expected benefits, and its
quantified costs were typically limited to a subset of the direct compliance burden, estimated for
an entirely different purpose: a mandate under the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA).”).
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Another possible objection might arise from an attempt to
analogize the regulatory impact analysis required by executive order
to presidential signing statements in the statutory context.
Presidential signing statements are essentially documents that
Presidents sometimes issue upon the signing of a bill. They vary in
substance but, as relevant here, can describe a bill, explain its
280
purpose, or advance a particular interpretation of the statute. One
objection to these statements is that they threaten to undermine
281
bicameralism and presentment.
The concern is that judicial
acknowledgement of them allows the President to legislate while
subverting constitutional strictures either by insulating his views from
282
a supermajority veto or else by allowing him a line-item veto.
Extending this critique to the regulatory context, one might
argue that asking a judge to interpret a regulation in light of the
materials generated by the OIRA-coordinated presidential review
process would essentially allow the President to exert more influence
than allowed by statute. Those who are skeptical of the legitimacy of
the President’s rulemaking role in the first place might reject
regulatory textualism for granting the President’s understanding of
the regulation undue weight. The distinctive institutional dynamics of
regulatory drafting, however, dispel such concerns. All of the
published materials arising from the presidential review process are
283
approved by the agency head before publication —unlike
presidential signing statements which are not considered by Congress
284
before the bill is signed. As a result, regulatory analyses are better
understood as the product of a back-and-forth between the President
and the agency head, rather than a unilateral statement of the

280. See Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive
Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307, 308 (2006).
281. See William D. Popkin, Judicial Use of Presidential Legislative History: A Critique, 66
IND. L.J. 699, 700 (1991) (addressing the concern that judicial use of legislative history is
improper because legislative history is not formal law and can be easily manipulated by
competing political factions). There is a sizeable literature on statements in which the President
expresses his constitutional concerns about a signed bill—raising different issues that are not
directly implicated here. See, e.g., Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power
of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1279–80 (1996); Marc N. Garber & Kurt
A. Wimmer, Presidential Signing Statements as Interpretations of Legislative Intent: An Executive
Aggrandizement of Power, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 363, 366–68 (1987).
282. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
283. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
284. Bradley & Posner, supra note 280, at 338.
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President alone. In addition, all of the relevant materials are also
sent to back to the agency head for his signature after OIRA has
completed its review, and then to Congress during its wait-and-see
286
periods under the CRA. As such, any incentives for the President to
strategically misstate his understanding of the rule would be
287
mitigated. For these reasons, any concerns that could arise from an
analogy to presidential signing statements fade in the rulemaking
288
arena.
Similar dynamics also help to mitigate another set of concerns
that might arise, this time from the potential dynamic effects of
regulatory textualism. Perhaps most obvious is a worry about
regulatory ossification. Because the approach allows judges to

285. See Sunstein, supra note 64, at 1848 (noting that “there are countless instances in which
the process of interagency comment during OIRA review, or the agency’s own continuing
consideration of the underlying issues, leads the agency to make changes quickly and with
enthusiasm”).
286. See supra notes 156–162 and accompanying text.
287. Cf. McNollgast, Legislative Intent, supra note 13, at 28 (“Presidential signing
statements, for example, cannot be rejected or overturned by Congress, and are not negotiated
with members of the legislative coalition. Hence, the potential for unchecked opportunistic
behavior by the president is great.”).
288. Furthermore, as a constitutional matter, the President also has a legitimate role to play
in exercising regulatory oversight consistently with underlying authorizing statutes. Such
oversight authority is exemplified by the President’s power to appoint officers not otherwise
provided for by heads of departments or the court, to coordinate agency actions, and to
emphasize his political priorities. Despite much academic debate about the significance of a
specific delegation to an agency head instead of the President, most agree that some degree of
oversight by agency heads is constitutional. See Sunstein, supra note 64, at 1874 n.126 (noting
that “[t]here is a great deal of academic discussion about whether the president may ‘overrule’
those within the executive branch, including Cabinet heads, who may be delegated a degree of
statutory discretion” but arguing that “[t]he issue has more theoretical interest than practical
importance” since “those who work for the President want to act consistently with his goals,
priorities, and views”). Moreover, in practice, the line between presidential direction and
oversight is often unclear. Strauss, supra note 64, at 704 (“The difference between oversight and
decision can be subtle, particularly when the important transactions occur behind closed doors
and among political compatriots who value loyalty and understand that the president who
selected them is their democratically chosen leader.”). The President’s primary recourse against
a recalcitrant agency head remains removal, but presidents shape agency rulemaking in myriad
ways, whether though ex parte informal communications, strong norms of loyalty, or budgetary
carrots and sticks. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 404–05 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stating that
informal meetings between the President and members of executive-branch agencies are
generally permitted during the rulemaking process). Furthermore, parties seeking judicial
review of an agency action are usually unable to prove that the President or his staff overrode
an agency head’s decision. As a result, constitutional challenges to the President’s rulemaking
involvement are often unlikely to succeed. See Robert V. Percival, Who’s in Charge? Does the
President Have Directive Authority Over Agency Regulatory Decisions?, 79 FORDHAM L. REV.
2487, 2535 (2011) (calling such scenarios “extremely rare”).
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consider the regulatory analyses and preambles, rulemaking could
become even costlier than it currently is since regulatory drafters will
now have to spend more time than they already do bargaining over
289
the relevant language. Relatedly, regulatory textualism could also
result in agencies becoming less willing to publicize their reasoning in
290
order to preserve their flexibility. One could also be concerned that
an increasing judicial focus on the regulatory preamble would
politicize the analyses as regulatory actors attempt to skew them in a
291
way that would be favorable to an interpretation they later desire.
Although the magnitude of these dynamic effects is an empirical
question, there are some reasons to think that the marginal incentives
created by regulatory textualism will be minimal since many of these
incentives already exist under current review procedures. For
example, the OIRA-coordinated review process already requires
multiple internal and external agency actors to comb through
multiple drafts of the preamble and negotiate its language. Moreover,
as others have noted, the ability of agencies to withhold information
relevant to the rulemaking is also constrained due to hard-look
judicial review’s requirement that the agency disclose all the relevant
292
data and evidence relied upon by the agency. Finally, the risks of
politicization under current review procedures are already well
known, and many have called for innovations such as peer review to
293
mitigate such risks. Consequently, the strategic dynamic effects of
calling upon judges to interpret regulations by reference to the
regulatory analyses and preamble are likely to be limited.
III. DEFERENCE
Given that regulatory textualism supplies a method for courts to
determine whether an agency’s construction is “plainly erroneous” or
289. See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process,
41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1419 (1992).
290. See Stack, supra note 9, at 417 (noting the risk that interpretive approaches that rely on
the statement of basis and purpose could “encourage an agency to be less explicit in its
statement of basis and purpose in order to preserve its future flexibility”).
291. See id.
292. See id. (observing that the incentive for agencies to issue vague statements of basis and
purpose are “checked” by the fact that “[t]he agency’s rule . . . will . . . have to survive hard-look
review and the demand for agency reason-giving”).
293. See Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg. 2664, 2674 (Jan.
14, 2005); Fred Anderson et al., Regulatory Improvement Legislation: Risk Assessment, CostBenefit Analysis, and Judicial Review, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 89, 92 (2000); Sidney A.
Shapiro, OMB and the Politicization of Risk Assessment, 37 ENVTL. L. 1083 (2007).
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“inconsistent” under Seminole Rock’s first step, the next issue is how,
and to what extent, a court should give an interpretation “controlling
294
weight” when the text is otherwise ambiguous. This Part argues that
deference is due to the agency’s interpretation as long as the agency
provides a sufficiently reasoned explanation for the interpretation.
A. Why Deference?
When the regulatory text is ambiguous, Seminole Rock deference
subordinates judicial interpretation to agency interpretation in that it
privileges the agency’s construction over that of the court—even
though the court may have read the regulation differently on its own.
Some have referred to this concept as “binding” deference,
emphasizing the primacy of the agency’s resolution of any regulatory
295
ambiguity. The opinion in Seminole Rock itself did little to justify
such deference, though a number of rationales have since been
296
297
invoked by later courts, and further elucidated by scholars. One
possible basis for judicial deference, for example, is that Congress’s
delegation of rulemaking authority to an agency necessarily includes
298
the authority to interpret those regulations. In other words, when
Congress grants an agency rulemaking power, it also grants the
agency the authority to interpret the resulting regulations. Judicial
299
deference follows from this presumed legislative choice.

294. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
295. See Manning, supra note 19, at 617, 621–23.
296. See id. at 629 (“Perhaps because of the perceived common sense appeal of Seminole
Rock deference, it took many years for the Court to offer any detailed rationale for the
doctrine.”); Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 88, at 1454 (noting that Seminole Rock “offered
no explanation whatsoever—nor even a citation to any other authority” for its principle).
297. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 19, at 629–31 (surveying rationales for Seminole Rock
deference); Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 88, at 1444–45 (same).
298. See, e.g., Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 681 (1991) (“From this
congressional delegation [to promulgate regulations] derives the Secretary’s entitlement to
judicial deference [to the interpretation of those regulations].”); Martin v. Occupational Safety
& Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1990) (“Because applying an agency’s regulation
to complex or changing circumstances calls upon the agency’s unique expertise and
policymaking prerogatives, we presume that the power authoritatively to interpret its own
regulations is a component of the agency’s delegated lawmaking powers.”).
299. See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 88, at 1444–45 (noting that courts’ pragmatic
rationales for Seminole Rock generally deploy—either implicitly or explicitly—a legal fiction
about congressional intent: “the presumption that when Congress delegated the agency the
authority to make rules with the force of law, it implicitly delegated to the agency the authority
to clarify those rules with subsequent (reasonable) interpretations that should themselves be
treated by courts as authoritative”).
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On the one hand, this argument seemingly parallels the basis for
Chevron deference to an agency’s statutory as opposed to regulatory
300
interpretation. That doctrine requires judicial deference to an
agency’s reasonable construction of a statute that the agency itself
301
administers when the statute is ambiguous. Courts presume that
the ambiguity reflects a legislative desire to delegate that
302
interpretive authority to the rulemaking agency, and not the courts.
On the other hand, as Manning and others have pointed out, there
are important differences between statutory and regulatory
interpretation that render this reasoning suspect for Seminole Rock
303
deference. Namely, when a regulation is ambiguous, that ambiguity
is not created by Congress, but rather by the rule-drafting agency. In
essence, by promulgating an ambiguous regulation, agencies are “selfdelegating” the power to engage in future lawmaking through
304
enforcement actions, adjudication, or nonlegislative rules.
By
contrast, when Congress drafts legislation, it cannot reserve the
305
power to control its enforcement. Nor can Congress attempt to
change or veto the interpretation of its own statute unless it passes
306
another statute to modify the previous statutory text. Thus, it is
unclear how Congress can delegate a power that it does not itself
possess.
300. See Stack, supra note 9, at 371–92 (drawing a parallel between Chevron and Seminole
Rock).
301. Manning, supra note 19, at 627 (“Seminole Rock adopts an approach to agency
interpretations of regulations that, in important respects, is quite similar to Chevron’s
framework for statutes.”); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842 (1984). Its two-part test is a familiar one: in Step One, the judge must ask “whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” If Congress’s intent is “clear,”
then that intention governs. If, however, the statute is ambiguous or silent, then in Step Two,
courts ask whether the agency’s interpretation is “permissible” and, if so, defer accordingly. Id.
at 842–43; Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV.
363, 370 (1986); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517; Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 2071, 2086 (1990).
302. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241 (2001) (“When, Chevron said,
Congress leaves an ambiguity in a statute that is to be administered by an executive agency, it is
presumed that Congress meant to give the agency discretion, within the limits of reasonable
interpretation, as to how the ambiguity is to be resolved.”).
303. See Manning, supra note 19, at 619–30.
304. Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 88, at 1471.
305. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 734 (1986) (“By placing the responsibility for
execution of the [Act] in the hands of an officer who is subject to removal only itself, Congress
in effect has retained control over the execution of the Act and had intruded into the executive
function.”).
306. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958 (1983).
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Beyond the delegation argument for deference is yet another
rationale that has been invoked by various courts, which
acknowledges the agency’s unique status as the regulatory drafter.
Because agency actors themselves were involved in the writing of the
rule, this argument goes, the agency is better situated relative to a
court to interpret its meaning. Matthew Stephenson and Miri
Pogoriler refer to this as the “originalist rationale” for Seminole Rock
307
deference. As they have also pointed out, however, the rationale’s
plausibility decreases the more years have gone by since the initial
rulemaking. The more time that passes, the more likely the original
political appointees and career staff involved are to have departed the
308
agency. The remaining career staff may now also face different
political overseers such that they are unlikely to sincerely reveal the
original meaning of or impetus for the enacted regulation.
Alternatively, one might acknowledge that the originalist and
delegation rationales are simply legal fictions and instead justify
deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation on more
baldly pragmatic grounds. This is likely the strongest basis for agency
309
deference, if any, as well as the most prevalent. In this view, the best
foundation for Seminole Rock deference arises from the recognition
that agencies are engaging in interstitial policy making when
interpreting an ambiguous regulation. Thus, judicial deference is
appropriate given the comparative institutional assessment that
310
agencies are superior policy makers compared to courts. As in
Chevron, such arguments are grounded in familiar arguments about
the agency’s superior political accountability and expertise relative to
311
a court.
Although agency heads are not elected, they are
presidentially appointed, Senate confirmed, and subject to continuing
oversight. Agencies also possess technical expertise as well as

307. See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 88, at 1454.
308. Id. at 1472–73.
309. Id. at 1457 (“As between these two justifications for Seminole Rock deference, the
pragmatic justification is ascendant, while the originalist rationale has been in decline.”).
310. Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 697 (1991); see also Thomas Jefferson
Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512–13 (1994).
311. See Manning, supra note 19, at 617–18 (explaining that “the Court justifies Seminole
Rock deference on the basis of an agency’s superior political accountability [and] policymaking
competence”); Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State:
Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary’s Structural Role, 53 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 100–01 (2000) (“Just as it did in justifying deference to agency interpretations of statutes
in Chevron, the Supreme Court has relied upon agency accountability and agency expertise to
justify judicial deference to agency interpretations of regulations.”).
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knowledge about how complicated regulatory schemes interact and fit
312
together. Thus, when a legislative rule is ambiguous, judges should
defer to the agency’s construction rather than impose their own.
Perhaps in a nod to Seminole Rock’s shifting moorings, a number
of Supreme Court members—most vocally Justices Scalia, Roberts,
and Alito—have expressed doubt about the viability of the doctrine
313
as recently as last Term. A few years before that, in Christopher v.
314
SmithKline Beecham Corp., a majority (including the same three
Justices as well as Justices Kennedy and Thomas) refused to grant
deference to the Department of Labor’s interpretation of its own
315
regulation. They did so on the grounds that the agency had
announced its new interpretation for the first time in amicus briefs
and in a manner that was inconsistent with its previous
316
interpretations. Instead of applying Seminole Rock deference, the
Court instead applied a more independent approach drawn from
317
Skidmore v. Swift. Under Skidmore, courts generally analyze
312. Though the often-inextricable relationship between politics and expertise in regulatory
policy helps to ground the dual underpinnings of deference, in cases where the two factors
seemingly pull in different directions, note that arbitrary-or-capricious review continues to
require agencies to justify their policy decisions in terms of expertise. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); supra notes 151–153
and accompanying text. In other words, when a change in political leadership results in a
regulatory interpretation that cannot be justified with reference to the available information,
then such agency decisions are less likely to be upheld despite any political official’s desire to
take responsibility. As such, agencies always remain subject to the requirement to give reasons
for new regulatory policies by reference to the best available data and information in the record,
with variations in scrutiny depending on the nature of the agency action. Merely invoking the
fact of new political leadership is currently insufficient on its own as a valid reason for
regulatory change. Instead, such a change must be publicly explained and justified with respect
to the available evidence. See Watts, supra note 151, at 18–20 (describing how arbitrary-orcapricious review focuses only on apolitical explanations grounded in expertise).
313. See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213 (2015) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (advocating that Auer deference be “abandon[ed]”); id. at 1225 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (arguing that “the entire line of precedent beginning with Seminole Rock raises
serious constitutional questions and should be reconsidered”). Justice Roberts and Justice Alito
also wrote separately in a case, for example, to state that “[t]he bar is now aware that there is
some interest in reconsidering [the Seminole Rock] cases, and has available to it a concise
statement of the arguments on one side of the issue.” Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct.
1326, 1338 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Justice Scalia, for his part, continued to reiterate
his case for Seminole Rock deference’s overdue demise. Id. at 1339 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
314. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
315. Id. at 2169.
316. Id.
317. See id. at 2168–69; see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (setting
out this standard).
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whether they find an agency’s interpretation to be persuasive. More
specifically, they look at a number of factors such as the
“thoroughness” of the agency’s consideration; the reasoning’s
“validity” and “consistency”; and, more generally, any factors which
give an interpretation the “power to persuade, if lacking power to
318
control.” By applying Skidmore instead of Seminole Rock, without
overruling or otherwise distinguishing the latter, the Court appeared
to be engaging in a threshold analysis of when Seminole Rock would
even apply.
A critical defining feature of the Skidmore deference regime is
that the court remains the authoritative interpreter that must be
319
swayed by the agency for the agency to win deference. In the
statutory-interpretation context, courts usually invoke such deference
when the agency has not been granted lawmaking authority, or when
the agency does not exercise such authority through formalized
procedures like formal adjudication or notice-and-comment
320
rulemaking. When the agency does not use such procedures to issue
its statutory interpretation, the reasoning goes, courts should be more
skeptical of the result and thus must be independently persuaded that
the interpretation is correct. A related rationale for the Skidmore
regime is that the court is a superior interpreter in situations when the
agency has not used deliberative procedures that provide fair notice
321
and invite public input.
Extending this logic to regulatory interpretation, one could argue
that Seminole Rock deference should similarly be restricted to
particular forms of agency action that use certain procedures such as

318. Id. John Manning has defended the Skidmore approach to regulatory deference on a
number of grounds. Most importantly, he argues that Skidmore supplies a critical “independent
interpretive check” on agency regulatory interpretation by contrast to Seminole Rock’s relative
capitulation. See Manning, supra note 19, at 687. Because an agency would no longer be able to
determine definitively the meaning of its own ambiguous rule, it would have greater incentive to
regulate more clearly in the text, thus providing clearer notice to regulated entities. Id. In
addition, because Skidmore depends on the persuasiveness of the agency’s explanation, it would
also spur agencies to provide more carefully considered justifications for the rule in their
statements of basis and purpose. Id. at 689. Finally, the approach duly recognizes that agencies
may have semantic insights into the specialized meaning of regulatory terms of art. Id. at 688.
319. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833,
856 (2001) (“Skidmore . . . makes clear that the weight given to the agency interpretation is
always ultimately up to the court.”).
320. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001).
321. Id.
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322

formal adjudication. One limitation of this approach, however, is
that the bulk of agency interpretive actions do not occur through such
procedures, but rather through more informal means, leaving most
323
agency interpretations to Skidmore deference as a practical matter.
Taken on its own terms, however, Skidmore does not fully appreciate
the pragmatic justifications for deference to an agency’s regulatory
interpretation when the text is otherwise ambiguous. As previously
discussed, an agency is more likely than a court to possess the
requisite expertise, experience, and accountability with which to
324
resolve better the textual ambiguity. In terms of institutional
capacity, agencies are also better situated to engage in interstitial
policy making that does not otherwise conflict with the regulatory
text; internally, they will have access to rulemaking materials such as
325
staff memoranda, public comments, and reports that courts will not.
Furthermore, Skidmore’s multifactor test also threatens interpretative
unpredictability and instability in providing notice to regulated
entities.
B. Regulatory Hard Look
For these reasons, regulatory textualism calls for an intermediate
approach between Seminole Rock and Skidmore deference. Given
regulatory textualism’s primacy on politically authorized texts from
the enacting agency, courts should create strong incentives for clear
regulatory drafting and supply a stronger judicial check on a
subsequent agency’s interpretation of the text’s public meaning.
Specifically, courts should require that later agencies supply a
reasoned explanation for their interpretation akin to that required
326
under arbitrary-and-capricious review. Such an approach would
draw upon an already-familiar concept in administrative law that
accords deference to the agency’s superior expertise and political ties,
322. See Stack, supra note 9, at 410–11 (discussing how Seminole Rock could be restricted
“to particular policymaking form”); Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 88, at 1484 (exploring
complexities in how “Mead’s rationale might also extend to Seminole Rock”).
323. Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 88, at 1490 (noting that “many statutory schemes
do not require formal adjudication”). As Stephenson & Pogoriler also point out, agencies could
voluntarily undertake additional procedures for otherwise informal actions, but it would be
unclear how much more procedure would merit Seminole Rock deference under Mead’s logic.
Id. Of course, if agencies undertook full notice-and-comment, they would simply be able to
amend the rule itself.
324. See supra notes 310–312 and accompanying text.
325. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 150–153 and accompanying text.
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while at the same time, extending a judicial check on the proffered
327
justifications.
This proposed approach recognizes that when the enacted text is
ambiguous or silent with respect to the interpretive question, agencies
are better equipped than courts to fill in the gaps of the regulation
328
through adjudication and enforcement of the rule. Agency heads
are not only more technically competent than judges, but may also
incrementally develop the rule against changing circumstances and
specific facts. Any arbitrary agency interpretations, by contrast,
would be invalid. Such actions would essentially be legislative in
character and would therefore need to go through the notice-andcomment process. At the same time, a hard look for regulatory
interpretations at the second step of Seminole Rock analysis would
also spur judges to regard such interpretations with more scrutiny
than they currently do. Consequently, the approach would facilitate
interpretations that stayed within the textual bounds of the legislative
rule and were developed through reason-giving.
Of course, the requisite reasons would differ from those
demanded of the agency when it originally promulgated the rule,
because the agency would now be attempting to resolve a narrower
ambiguity left open by the initial regulatory text. In addition, there
would not be a full rulemaking record that the agency would have to
justify. Nevertheless, this regime would help to promote a more
common-law-like evaluation of the agency’s proffered interpretation
329
against the regulatory text. Moreover, unlike a wholesale extension
of Skidmore deference, it would also not require an overruling or
extreme modification of Seminole Rock, which demands that courts
330
give an agency’s interpretation “controlling” weight. A hard look
for agency’s interpretations when the text is otherwise ambiguous
balances the need for agency flexibility to update regulatory policy,

327. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983) (emphasizing that, despite hard look, “scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and
capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency”).
328. Indeed, some commenters have noted that administrative agencies are better
situated—and more likely—to act purposively when engaging in statutory interpretation; such
arguments are even stronger when it comes to an agency’s own regulations. See VERMEULE,
supra note 18, at 111; Herz, supra note 23, at 118; Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 18, at 928.
329. See Richard W. Murphy, Hunters for Administrative Common Law, 58 ADMIN. L. REV.
917, 927 (2006).
330. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
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on the one hand, against the countervailing needs for fair notice and
accountability, on the other.
CONCLUSION
This Article has developed a theory of regulatory interpretation
grounded in the unique character of regulatory texts as products of
various procedures imposed by politically authoritative actors with
veto-gate power. Agency regulations are subject to oversight by the
President, Congress, and the courts through procedures that invite
the active participation of interest groups and the public. These actors
and mechanisms supply political and legal legitimacy to the binding
lawmaking activities of otherwise-unelected bureaucrats. Any theory
of regulatory interpretation must take these dynamics into account.
Regulations also implement statutes in narrow policy arenas and
thus use language that is necessarily complex and specialized.
Considerations of judicial capacity and agency constraint thus counsel
the rejection of intentionalism and purposivism as methods of judicial
regulatory interpretation. Instead, regulatory textualism calls for the
structured judicial consideration of materials within the ratified
preamble in order to discern the semantic meaning of the regulatory
text: the provision-by-provision explanations in the statement of basis
and purpose, followed by the regulatory analyses. If these materials
are ambiguous or otherwise conflict, then the court should defer to
the agency as long as the agency gives a reasoned explanation for its
interpretation. In this manner, regulatory textualism attempts to
vindicate the need for flexibility alongside the agency and other
political actors’ duty to publicly explain their regulatory decisions. At
the same time, it seeks to leave the development of regulatory policy
to administrators who, unlike judges, are more capable of reacting to
changed circumstances and fitting regulatory means to ends.

